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7Introduction: 
Civilian Peacekeeping – A Barely Tapped Resource 
By Christine Schweitzer 
In August 2007, the coordinator of the local peace process organization in Mindanao (Philippines) 
reported: “Thanks to Nonviolent Peaceforce, we did not evacuate our village earlier this month. We are 
1,000 people living here. We have never evacuated yet, through the Spanish, Japanese and American 
colonizers, and now the Philippines’ own internal armed forces.” 
During a recent tense situation, with two armed groups threatening each other from opposite sides of 
the village, only 200 meters separated the potential combatants. Villagers were frightened and prepared 
to leave. NP members came into the village and communicated with both armed groups to defuse the 
situation. Part of the reason for the flare-up, it turned out, was a misunderstanding, with one armed 
group interpreting a threat from the other when none was intended.1
During 2007 and early 2008, Peace Brigades International accompanied the Solidarity Committee 
for Political Prisoners (CSPP) on visits to Casanare in eastern central Colombia. Due to the presence of 
the oil industry, it is a highly militarised region, where the campesinos have suffered at the hands of all 
parties to the conflict. The CSPP requested PBI’s accompaniment to enable them to conduct investigations 
into extrajudicial executions. This process took them into remote areas where it would have been too 
dangerous to go without PBI’s presence, as well as to the headquarters of the army brigade alleged to have 
committed most of the killings. In this way, with PBI’s accompaniment, CSPP continued their work 
against impunity, through direct investigations and by giving the local population the tools with which 
they could gain access to justice.2
Two reports from the Truce/Peace Monitoring Mission in Bougainville: 
While on the topic of security, it is probably worth commenting on the concept of being unarmed. This 
is an interesting concept for military personnel, but one that is apparently becoming more common in 
peace operations. There is no doubt in my mind that being unarmed in Bougainville is the correct posture. 
Relying on the Bougainville people to ensure the safety of peace monitors reinforces the message that peace 
for Bougainville is the responsibility of the people of Bougainville. They are only too aware that should the 
safety of the Peace Monitoring Group (PMG) be placed at risk, there is a very real danger that the peace 
process will falter. This was emphasised on a number of occasions when Bougainvillians assisted patrols 
in difficult circumstances. The PMG provides the environment for the peace process, and many fear the 
consequences should they depart. (Major Luke Foster, Australian Defence Force, 1999)  
The decision to go to Bougainville unarmed caused some angst  in the Australian Defence Force at the 
time, but it was the right one. At least two occasions I encountered may have gone differently if we had 
been armed.   Perhaps more fundamentally, the Truce Monitoring Group (TMG) experience reaffirmed 
for me that the role of peacekeepers is to not only stand between the warring sides to prevent more suffering 
but also to encourage the coming together of divided people. (Andrew Rice, Australian Department of 
Defence, 1999)
In spite of the encouraging statistics that the number of wars has actually been decreasing for 
some time now, there is no doubt that war remains one of the greatest causes of human suffering. 
It is so much more tragic as it is a totally human-made cause and therefore should be more easily 
be avoided than natural disasters. 
There are certainly a number of reasons why something that should be so easy proves so difficult. 
It must not be denied that superficially and under a short-term perspective war has often been a 
successful instrument of handling conflict—otherwise it would have died out long ago. Defence 
against the evil neighbour rather than admitted aggressive intentions has also been a very strong 
1 Nonviolent Peaceforce (2008)
2 Peace Brigades International (2008)
3 These two quotes are taken from the papers of  a Seminar at the Australian National University (Seminar: Monitoring 
Peace in Bougainville, 1999). The mission it refers to is the Truce/Peace Monitoring Group (TMG/PMG) at the end of  
the 1990s (see footnote 15 below), an unarmed peacekeeping mission staffed by a mixture of  soldiers and civilians.
4 See Human Security Centre 2008, Arbeitsgemeinschaft Kriegsursachenforschung 2008. Akuf. Currently 28 wars, 14 
other armed conflicts. 
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legitimization for armament and war for thousands of years. Institutions that have been built around 
war, especially in the past 200 years – the organized military based on mass recruitment of citizens, 
the arms industry and growing dependency on resources from faraway places – are also important 
factors which must not be neglected, even if not subscribing to the beliefs of leftist antimilitarists 
who see economic interests as the exclusive causes for militarism and war. 
There are many ideas regarding how war could be overcome. Some build their hope on common 
security and disarmament agreements; others see the world moving towards a system in which the 
UN eventually plays the role individual governments play today; still others believe that only civil 
society and social movements, acting transnationally and in solidarity, will be able to do away with 
the differences of today. Many argue that abolishing war requires the development of functional 
equivalents for defence and protection that are currently fulfilled by the military – equivalents not for 
waging war for oil or strategic interests, but alternative ways to defend oneself against an aggressor, 
to peacefully settle ethnic and other intrastate conflicts, and to control potential perpetrators of 
violence so that they “at least stop destroying things, others, and themselves.” (Galtung 1996:103)
This last function is the meaning of peacekeeping. Peacekeeping is one component in the total 
picture of functions and strategies that are needed when seeking to transform conflict and eventually 
overcome war. In many cases, peacekeeping has proven essential in
monitoring ceasefire agreements and building the trust necessary to overcome conflict in the 
post-war stage;
controlling buffer zones, disarmament, and demobilization;
protection of the civilian population in general or of especially vulnerable groups (such as 
minorities and internally displaced people - IDPs) in all phases of a conflict;
preventing violence in such critical moments as elections, referenda, or the implementation of 
other agreements.
The term “peacekeeping” seems to have its origins with the United Nations. It was the “UN 
Emergency Force” (UNEF 1) that was established in response to the invasion of Egypt by British 
and French forces during the Suez Canal crisis which first was termed a “peacekeeping” mission, 
and at the same time defined what today can be considered classical military peacekeeping.6 
While such peacekeeping missions are still being carried out, new types of peacekeeping have 
been developed since 1988. These newer types are often multidimensional, inasmuch as they include 
5 Since the Secretary General of  the United Nations, Boutros Boutros-Ghali published in 1992 the Agenda for Peace, the 
triad of  peacebuilding, peacemaking and peacekeeping has become well known. However, it was not Boutros-Ghali 
who invented these terms but Johan Galtung (1976) 20 years earlier who called them “approaches to peace”. Since then 
these terms have been refined by other authors such as the social anthropologist Stephen Ryan who speaks of  “peace 
strategies” (Ryan 1995:102). Together, these three strategies formulate a general theory of  achieving or maintaining 
peace. As Miall et al have written:
With reference to the conflict triangle, it can be suggested that peace-making aims to change the attitudes of  the main protagonists, 
peace-keeping lowers the level of  destructive behaviour, and peace-building tries to overcome the contradictions which lie at the root of  
the conflict (Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999:22). 
For both Galtung and Ryan these three strategies are seen as complementary, to be pursued at the same time. Peace-
keeping without peace-making and peace-building would be very difficult because the violence might overwhelm 
the process, and any group wishing to sabotage a peace initiative would find it easy to provoke armed clashes. If  
peace-building is ineffective, the decision-makers might lose the support of  their communities, and if  peace-making 
is ineffective, the perceived disagreement that caused the conflict will remain unresolved, and the probability that 
violence would restart would be high. (Ryan 1995:117 pp).
6 However, the reality preceded the naming, as it is often the case. There were already at least two missions of  the 
League of  Nations after World War I which would fall under the same category, among them the „Saar International 
Force“ 1934-1935. It was sent to the Saar region to oversee the plebiscite that resulted in the return of  the region to 
Germany after 15 years of  rule of  the Saar region by a Governing Commision that had been appointed by the League 
of  Nations after WW I. (See Ramsbotham & Woodhouse 1999:130.)
7 These missions were governed by five principles:
•
•
•
•
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reconstruction, state-building, civil society support and other peacebuilding tasks. The peacekeepers 
are heavily armed, often sent under Chapter VII of the UN Charter,  powerful countries participate 
in the missions, and the peacekeepers usually operate in an environment very different from those 
of classical peacekeeping missions—an environment of intrastate conflict where one or both sides 
are hostile to the peacekeepers.8
The by now almost traditional picture of the lightly-armed Blue Helmet standing on some 
street surrounded by curious children has today (due to these developments and to wars like those 
in Afghanistan and Iraq, which are falsely presented to the international public as ‘humanitarian’) 
been replaced by the picture of a NATO soldier in combat dress sitting in an armoured vehicle, 
driving around in fear of a suicide attack by terrorists. 
But at the same time as what I would call the “militarisation of peacekeeping” happened, the 
concept of alternative peacekeeping  undertaken by unarmed civilians also has gained ground. 
The Manifestations of Civilian Peacekeeping
I would like to define civilian peacekeeping as the prevention of direct violence through 
influence or control of the behaviour of potential perpetrators by unarmed civilians who are 
deployed on the ground.
In the literature one can find different terms besides “civilian peacekeeping” (which was already 
used by Charles Walker in 1981) that describe more or less the same concept:
Peace Army (Shanti Sena in Hindi), a concept originating with Gandhi and Abdul Ghaffar 
Khan in the 1930s (see Weber 1996, Easwaran 2002);9
Nonviolent intervention across borders (Moser-Puangsuwan & Weber 2000);
Third-party nonviolent intervention (this term is often used in the US-American nonviolence 
movement – it is unclear who coined it);
Peace force (used early by the British MP Henry Usborne in a suggestion to send an unarmed 
force to patrol the demilitarised zone between Egypt and Israel in 196);
Interpositionary peace force (Weber 1993);
World Police Force (term used probably first by the British MP Richard Acland in 198);10
White Berets (a term developed in advocacy work, relating to the proposal of unarmed UN 
forces);11
1. Consent of  the parties to the dispute for the establishment of  the mission;
2. Non-use of  force except in self-defence;
3. Voluntary contribution of  troop contingents from smaller, neutral countries or middle powers;
4. Impartiality;
5. Day-to-day control of  the operation by the Secretary-General. 
See Ramsbotham & Woodhouse 1999:xi. These five principles were laid down by then Secretary-General Hammarskjöld 
and Canadian diplomat Lester Pearson. 
8 See Ramsbotham & Woodhouse 1999:xiii pp. In 2009, there were 18 UN peacekeeping missions with more than 
120,000 staff  (90,000 soldiers and police) at an annual cost of  more than US $8 billion (Bennett 2009). In addition, there 
are the NATO and EU-led peacekeeping missions in Europe (KFOR in Kosovo, EUFOR in Bosnia-Hercegovina) and 
the controversial NATO-led ISAF in Afghanistan.
9 The focus of  civilian peacekeeping lies of  course on external actors. But it must not be overlooked that it is often 
the local communities and citizens themselves who are the first agents of  their own protection (see Barrs 2009). And 
there are also countries where groups form who consider themselves local peacekeepers (e.g. Bantay Ceasefire in the 
Philippines, see Bantay Ceasefire 2003). The most famous of  this sort are of  course the mentioned Shanti Sena in India 
who consist of  people living and working in their own communities (see Weber 1996).
10 See Weber 2000 and Schweitzer et al 2001 (appendix to chapter 2).
11 See Moser-Puangsuwan & Weber 2000a:6.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Peace teams, a term becoming fashionable in the 1980s and 1990s, with a number of 
organisations referring to themselves and the type of work they were doing as “peace teams” 
(e.g. Christian Peacemaker Teams, Balkan Peace Team, etc).
Activities that could be summarized under the heading of civilian peacekeeping have a history 
that goes back at least to the 1930s, with certainly earlier cases yet to be discovered in the history 
books (see Weber 2000, Schweitzer et al 2001) and with Gandhi’s concept of a Shanti Sena as 
model.  Civilian Peacekeeping as it is presents itself today has different sources or roots as the 
different terminologies listed above illustrate:
1. The first was Gandhi’s concept of  a Peace Army (Shanti Sena) which also became known 
between the World Wars in Europe and was realized as a sort of  community defence force by 
Gandhi’s successor Vinoba Bhave in 1957. 
2. This idea was taken up several times by Europeans (mostly in Britain) who tried (usually 
unsuccessfully) to build up ‘peace armies’ to interposition themselves in certain conflicts.12 
3. Related to the first have been various proposals by individuals and organisations, and directed 
mostly at the United Nations (since the 1990s also at the European Union), to establish a 
standing unarmed peacekeeping force.13
4. A third source has been the different volunteer services that have developed since World War 
I seeking to contribute to reconciliation (particularly among youth) through voluntary work 
(Service Civil International, the various services of  Christian Churches, etc.)14
5. The fourth source of  inspiration has of  course been military peacekeeping. This is particularly 
true for unarmed governmental missions. 
Out of these four sources, different types of activities have been developed today that are at the 
core of civilian peacekeeping:
1. Different peace team organisations, with quite different approaches, methods and philosophies. 
At one end of  the spectrum is Peace Brigades International. PBI was founded in 1981 and 
has specialised in nonpartisan protective accompaniment of  human rights activists and been 
very successful in this work in many countries (Guatemala, El Salvador, Colombia, Sri Lanka, 
Nepal, Indonesia).  At the other end are groups – often of  fundamentalist Christian orientation 
– engaging in solidarity work with people they perceive as oppressed, particularly in countries 
in which the United States (home to most of  these groups) is involved in the conflicts.15
2. The 1990s saw the first larger civilian missions with protection mandates deployed by 
governments or international organisations: The European Community (later European Union) 
Monitoring Mission (ECMM) and the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) in the former 
12 The first was probably the proposal by an British Anglican minister, Maude Roydon, to organise a nonviolent ‚army‘ 
to intervene in the war between Japan and China. In 1931, Japan had occupied Manchuria, and the fighting threatened 
to start again in 1932. Royden was inspired by Gandhi whom she had met personally. Together with two supporters, 
she published the proposal in the London Daily Express, and later presented it to the League of  Nations which did not 
consider her idea. Because of  lack of  both recruits (they only found about 1,000 volunteers, well short of  the numbers 
they hoped for) and funds, the peace army proposal failed. The initiators continued to work for a few years on their 
idea, sending a team of  volunteers to Palestine for a couple of  years. The initiative eventually died with the onset of  
World War II (see Weber 2000).
13 See Schweitzer et.al 2001, appendix to chapter 2, for a list of  such proposals.
14 See Schweitzer et al 2001, Clark 2009:89-90
15 I am omitting short-term actions like peace walks, caravans and the like, as they took place during the second Iraq 
war and in Bosnia-Hercegovina between 1992 and 1995 (see Schweitzer 2009b) because of  their structural incapacity 
for sustainable impact on the violence in a conflict. 
•
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Yugoslavia16  and the Truce / Peace Monitoring Group in Bougainville17 are examples, as are 
today’s EU observers in Georgia.
3. In the last ten years relief, development (and human rights) organisations have increasingly begun 
to realize that humanitarian protection is a task they must take into account in their programming 
and work in the field (see the references given below in the section on “research”).
4. The fourth has yet to come to completion: Larger-scale unarmed civilian peacekeeping by 
nongovernmental organisations (NGOs). The NGO Nonviolent Peaceforce has (as did many 
earlier organisations) set itself  the goal to grow to numbers that would enable it to deploy 
enough civilian peacekeepers to permit comparison to governmental peacekeeping missions, 
but in spite of  quick progress over the last years and growing recognition by a number of  
governments who fund its activities, it has yet to reach this aim.
Table 1) Roots and Types of Civilian Peacekeeping
Civilian Peacekeeping is being used for different purposes and situations. Probably the most 
important that can be distinguished currently are:
Monitoring of ceasefire agreements (examples are the mentioned KVM and TMG as well as 
many other monitoring missions (see Mahony 2006);
16 See 33pp in this Working Paper.
17 Bougainville is an island that belonged to Papua New Guinea. Since 1988, Bougainville went through a serious civil 
war between the “Bougainville Revolutionary Army” fighting for independence of  the island from Papua New Guinea 
(PNG), and the PNG defence forces, supported by Australia. The war was brought to an end by two agreements in 
1997 and 1998, and as part of  the agreements, an unarmed Truce Monitoring Group (TMG) was established. Under the 
leadership of  the New Zealand military, in 1997 approximately 370 soldiers and civilians from New Zealand, Australia, 
Fiji and Vanuatu were sent to Bougainville to monitor the cease-fire and the implementation of  the agreement. All 
members of  the TMG had to be unarmed and wear civilian clothes, because an armed peacekeeping force would have 
been refused by the parties in conflict. The operation was set up according to military standards and rules, using a 
military infrastructure and approach. Most of  the staff  today are based in a tent camp in one central location. From 
there they go out to patrols in the villages to explain the cease-fire agreement and through their presence prevent 
new violence. See Böge 1999, Seminar: Monitoring Peace in Bougainville (1999) and the NP Feasibility Study, chapter 2 
(Schweitzer et al 2001).
•
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Prevention of violence during particularly volatile situations, e.g. when elections or referenda 
are upcoming (e.g. the EMPSA mission in South Africa before and during the first free elections 
in 199 (see Schweitzer et al 2001);
Protection of vulnerable groups and communities (e.g. protection of IDPs or ethnic minorities; 
an example is the work of NP in the Philippines (see the contributions in this Working 
Paper).
Human and civil rights monitoring can also be seen as part of civilian peacekeeping since it 
usually has an element of direct protection of victims (see Mahony 2006);
Protection of activists in the sense of opening space for them so that they can do their work 
without fear of being kidnapped or murdered (Peace Brigades International being the classic 
example);
Protection of activist communities such as those in Colombia that declared themselves peace 
zones (again PBI is the best example);
Protection of activists and communities in the sense of not only opening space for them but 
actively participating as internationals in their (nonviolent) actions (see below);
In theory, there is also the goal to prevent a war by interpositioning of internationals between 
warring parties – the basic idea of the various early peace army proposals as well as of more 
recent peace walks (see Schweitzer et al 2001, Moser-Puangsuwan & Weber 2000b). These, 
however, have so far never been successful and remain a vision, one that many (including the 
author) doubt can ever put into practice given the realities of modern war.
The articles in this Working Paper describe in greater detail what types of activities are undertaken 
within the framework of Civilian Peacekeeping. Therefore, it should only be remarked here in the 
introduction that civilian peacekeeping is based on the presence of people, be it people calling 
themselves civilian peacekeepers, accompaniers, or humanitarian workers. But it is much more than 
presence, monitoring, accompaniment and interpositioning, the activities of civilian peacekeepers 
most often listed. Civilian Peacekeeping is usually multi-dimensional – it is at least as much about 
bringing parties in conflict together and building capacity of local communities—and that goes for 
most governmental missions as well as for peace teams and the work of Nonviolent Peaceforce. 18
One more issue needs to be addressed: Peacekeeping is usually considered to be necessarily and 
absolutely impartial in regard to the conflict issues and the objectives pursued by the parties to 
the conflict. It seeks to help implement an agreement made by the conflict sides, or to protect and 
uphold matters of international law (e.g. protection of civilians). But as mentioned above, there 
are also groups that focus on protection, but who consciously seek to support one side in a conflict 
in its struggle. They usually argue that in extremely asymmetrical power situations there can be 
no nonpartisanship. Perhaps the best examples are the various international groups and projects 
currently active in Palestine, such as the International Solidarity Movement. They are in Palestine to 
support the Palestinian struggle against the Israeli occupation, and often do not hesitate to initiate 
actions of their own rather than only opening space for local groups to design and carry out their 
own activities.
Between these two extremes are projects and organisations (like PBI or the Balkan Peace Team 
in the 1990s) that consider themselves nonpartisan and who argue that they do not support the 
struggle of those they accompany but are there to uphold human rights and thereby “open space” 
for these local activists to pursue their struggle. I would place this position in the middle between 
truly nonpartisan action and solidarity action.
18 See Slim & Bonwick, Mahony 2006, Schirch 2006, Schweitzer 2009a, and also Julian’s article in this paper.
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Table 2) Objectives of Civilian Peacekeeping
How Civilian Peacekeeping “Works” 
Accustomed as they are to the predominant frame of thinking that violence is the only source 
of protection, many people find it hard to understand what an unarmed peacekeeper can achieve in 
a violent environment. It is true that unarmed civilians do not have means for direct enforcement 
– they cannot shoot and kill attacking perpetrators what military peacekeepers nowadays usually 
are mandated and equipped for. Unarmed peacekeepers do, however, have their own sources of 
power:19
Internationals are – at least to a certain degree which may vary from place to place – somewhat 
protected from violence because they are respected per se or because the countries or 
organisations they come from enjoy such respect. This is particularly true in countries of the 
Global South where past and present power disparities protect those coming from the Global 
North or representing the international community (UN). The fact that they themselves are 
protected can be transmitted to individuals, groups and communities they are accompanying 
because a potential perpetrator risks hurting or killing these internationals if he attacks.
In addition, the potential perpetrator risks having these internationals report the misdeed to 
the international world, which may lead to direct or indirect repercussions for them.  These 
may include pressure by supporters of the perpetrators who find themselves vulnerable to 
international discredit or sanctions. “The world is watching” has often proved a powerful 
deterrent.
19 See the paper by Rachel Julian in this publication, Mahony & Eguren 1997, Schirch 2006, Schweitzer 2009a.
•
•
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Internationals and locals may be protected because of the standing they have within the 
local community (e.g. village elders), and again transmit this standing to the community as a 
whole.
All of these sources of protection are relative, of course. Perpetrators may be aware of these 
factors but disregard them, or there may be countries and areas where internationals are hated 
for, rather than protected by, their status as outsiders – our Western countries unfortunately 
tending to be such places.
Nevertheless, when taking a step back and looking at the efficiency of nonviolence as such, it must 
be recognized that the means of nonviolence are very powerful. 20 Without the use of any organised 
violence, “people power” movements have overthrown numerous dictatorships (e.g. Philippines, 
former Yugoslavia) , have liberated countries from colonial rule (India, Zambia) and have made 
very powerful countries withdraw their armies from foreign places they invaded (Vietnam War). 21 
Even under the Nazi regime—hardly known for its lenience regarding civil society protest—civil 
society in Germany as well as the countries occupied by the German forces in World War II was 
often able to protect Jews or other threatened groups. Famous examples include the teachers in 
Norway refusing to submit to the implementation of a fascist school curriculum and the ‘’women 
of the Rosenstreet’ – women married to Jews who when their husbands were arrested in 192, 
protested in front of the prison in Berlin at the Rosenstreet until their husbands were released.22 
Research on Civilian Peacekeeping
Compared to other fields in peace and conflict research, civilian peacekeeping has so far received 
very little attention.
Studies and other publications on “peace teams,” “cross-boundary intervention” or civilian 
peacekeeping mostly consist of case studies and overviews of different projects, missions and 
organisations. Aside of a few articles in magazines and the book edited by Hare and Blumberg 
(19), the first scientific studies on this topic only came out in the middle of the 1990s.  Coy 
(1993 and 199) on the work of PBI, Buettner (199) on peace brigades in general, Schirch (199) 
on civilian peacekeeping, Weber (1996) on Shanti Sena, and  Mahony & Eguren (199) on the 
theory of nonviolent deterrence based on the PBI experience are the first ones of which I am aware. 
In the last ten years, the main publications on the issues appear to have been Moser-Puangsuwan 
& Weber (eds., 2000), the NP Feasibility Study (Schweitzer et al. 2001), Müller (200) on the 
Balkan Peace Team, Slim & Eguren 200 and Slim & Bonwick (200) on humanitarian protection, 
Schirch (2006) with an update of her 199 study on civilian peacekeeping, and Mahony (2006) 
on “proactive presence”, a comparative study based on an overview of governmental missions. Also 
Clark (ed., 2009) contains a section on “nonviolent citizens’ intervention across borders.”
Very much related to the issue (though not using the terminology of “civilian peacekeeping”) 
is the discussion of strategies and methods of humanitarian protection that developed in the last 
ten years, usually referring to humanitarian protection as a task “to mainstream” by humanitarian 
organisations.  Among them are the report on a framework-setting Workshop on Protection for 
Human Rights and Humanitarian Organizations held by the International Committee of the Red 
20 For literature on people power, see the bibliography on people power by Carter, Clark and Randle (2006).
21 See the articles in Moser-Puansuwan & Weber 2000. Also the UN Secretary General remarks about the power of  
local citizens in his recent report on R2P when he says that „even in the worst genocide, there are ordinary people who refuse to 
be complicit in the collective evil.“ (United Nations Secretary-General 2009:14).
22 See Semelin 1995.
•
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Cross (1999), the handbook on human rights protection by the United Nations Inter-Agency 
Standing Committee 2002, the already-mentioned Slim & Eguren 200, and Slim & Bonwick 200 
on humanitarian protection in general, O’Callaghan & Pantuliano 200 on “Incorporating civilian 
protection into humanitarian response,” and the International Committee of the Red Cross (2008) 
on “enhancing protection.” Also the papers that have been published after the 2009 conference of 
the University of Oxford’s Refugee Studies Centre on humanitarian protection (http://www.rsc.
ox.ac.uk/) are worth mentioning here. 
The Articles in This Publication
The articles have been written independently of each other and for different audiences. These 
audiences had in common that they were mainstream policymakers and scientists, not people from 
the peace and nonviolence movements. Also in this paper here one will notice that while all authors 
basically pursue the same idea, there are nuances in their definitions and emphases, as well as in their 
ideas regarding how civilian peacekeeping could be advanced to become a full-fledged alternative to 
military peacekeeping. All the authors have for some time (or, in the case of Rolf Carrière) still are 
involved with the NGO Nonviolent Peaceforce, and therefore chose the majority of their examples 
from the experiences of the work of NP.
In mid-2009, Rolf Carrière addressed an audience of politicians, leading military personnel 
and local civil society leaders in the Philippines in a series of two events that presented the notion of 
civilian protection in peacekeeping as an element for the upcoming new peace process agreements 
between the government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.
In his paper “The World Needs ‘Another Peacekeeping,” he begins by describing the global 
context of wars in which the ideas of peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding arose. Then, 
after listing some of the limitations of armed peacekeeping, he summarizes what unarmed civilian 
peacekeeping is, how it operates, and why unarmed peacekeeping and direct human protection, 
actually works. Thereafter he refers to some recent writings on the economics of war and the 
disproportionate benefits of stopping war and to build peace. In his conclusions, Carrière argues 
that unarmed civilian peacekeeping should now be scaled up worldwide, not least for the helpful, 
practical and benign contribution it can make to the ongoing global discourse about Human 
Security, about Immediate Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, and the new Humanitarian Protection 
agenda.
Tim Wallis presented his paper “Best Practices for Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping” at the same 
conference in the Philippines. He distinguishes five types of civilian peacekeepers: unarmed military, 
international police, unarmed civilians with an official mandate (for example UN observers), 
unarmed civilians from civil society (for example from humanitarian NGOs) and unarmed civilians 
with special skills and mandate for peacekeeping (Nonviolent Peaceforce). He illustrates with 
some examples what unarmed civilians can do in regard to violence prevention. In the last section 
of his paper he discusses underlying principles that determine the degree of success of civilian 
peacekeeping: 1. nonpartisanship,  independence and being international, 2. nonviolence and 3. 
visibility, transparency, quiet diplomacy, and cultural sensitivity. He concludes by saying that mere 
presence is not enough to deter violence, nor are governmental missions in some cases, and that 
there is a role for trained and mandated civilian peacekeepers being deployed by NGOs.
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Rachel Julian’s paper “Peacekeeping with Nonviolence: Protection Strategies for Sustainable 
Peace” was originally drafted for a conference the Refugees Study Centre in Oxford held in 
September 2009. 
Like Carrière, she begins by placing peacekeeping into the framework of the triad of peacemaking, 
peacebuilding and peacekeeping, and discusses advantages unarmed peacekeeping has over UN 
Blue Helmets. Referring mostly to Schirch (2006) and Eguren (2009), Julian goes on to describe 
different approaches and methodologies of civilian peacekeeping.
She concludes that peacekeeping in general is an important function when seeking to move 
from war to peace, that it should take a greater role, and that its activities can benefit those who live 
in fear of direct violence.
The first of Christine Schweitzer’s two papers, “Humanitarian Protection as an Additional 
Function of Humanitarian, Development and Peace Projects—or Rather a Task Requiring Experts?” 
was drafted for the same conference in Oxford. It deals with one aspect of the discussion on civilian 
peacekeeping, namely whether mainstreaming of protection as a task of all humanitarian agencies 
is all the answer the protection needs require, or if in situations of extensive tension it is preferable 
or more effective to have organisations concentrating solely on civilian peacekeeping. 
Based on two case studies, the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s and the work of Nonviolent 
Peaceforce in the Philippines since 200, she compares the advantages of both approaches and 
comes to the conclusion, that there are situations in which the presence of specialized unarmed 
peacekeepers may be advantageous.
Christine Schweitzer’s second paper, “The Responsibility to Protect: Towards an Expanded Role 
for Global Civil Society” looks at the doctrine of the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) and points 
out that in the discussion so far the role of local and international civil society in contributing to the 
different phases (prevent, react and rebuild) and the three pillars (the state in question dealing with 
the problem itself, international assistance and intervention against the will of the state in question) 
has not been adequately recognized. She agrees with those authors who point out that R2P is much 
more than a pretext for legitimizing so-called “humanitarian intervention”, and argues that civil 
society in particular has an important role to play in preventing that a “R2P-situation” (pillar 3) 
arises at all. Civilian peacekeeping is one possible strategy of civil society in this context.
17
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The World Needs ‘Another Peacekeeping’ 
By Rolf C. Carriere 
Introduction
People around the world are beginning to see the limits of meeting violence with only armed, 
military means, either to restore and keep the peace, to protect civilians, or to resolve conflicts. 
Therefore, interest has been growing to try out a variety of new peacekeeping methods. Attention 
has recently turned toward larger-scale, unarmed peacekeeping efforts initiated by civil society 
organizations, undertaken independently or in association with pertinent UN and regional agencies. 
This concept and practice of unarmed civilian peacekeeping is probably the least understood and 
least recognized among the different roles, strategies and capacities civil society organizations may 
bring to peace processes. But it reflects that profound global shift that is taking place: from national 
to human security, and from the defence of states to the protection of civilians.
Hereunder I will first briefly describe the global context of wars in which the ideas of 
peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding arose. Then, after listing some of the limitations of 
armed peacekeeping, I will summarize what unarmed civilian peacekeeping is, how it operates, and 
why unarmed peacekeeping and direct human protection, actually works. Thereafter I will refer to 
some recent writings on the economics of war and the disproportionate benefits of stopping war 
and to build peace. And I will conclude by arguing that unarmed civilian peacekeeping should now 
be scaled up worldwide, not least for the helpful, practical and benign contribution it can make to 
the ongoing global discourse about Human Security, about Immediate Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, 
and the new Humanitarian Protection agenda. 
Much War, Little Peace
But before that, let me share with you a sobering reflection on war and peace, to put our 
challenge in a historic perspective. We all know that violence and war have been with us throughout 
history—and even before that! But exactly how much it had been the norm I had not realized until 
I came across the following astounding statistics. It is estimated that “between 1500 BCE and 1860 
CE there were in the known world an average of thirteen years of war to every year of peace.” In that 
whole period of well over 3000 years “more than 8000 peace treaties were concluded—each one of them 
meant to remain in force for ever. On average they only lasted two years!” (Stevens 1989:-6).
One obvious conclusion from this is that peace treaties don’t guarantee peace—because they 
often don’t resolve conflicts. At best, peace treaties provide a brief interlude without violent action, 
to give the conflict parties a chance to get down to the tough task of peacebuilding, to address the 
deeper causes of the war, to get the peace right. 
But the fact is that, since Roman times, that window of opportunity, that chance for peace, was 
almost never seriously seized. Si vis pacem, para bellum! was, and has remained, the prevailing adage: 
if you want peace, prepare (for) war!
Even in the second part of the 20th century, after the United Nations in 19 had solemnly 
declared to be “…determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war…” more than 
200 wars were fought (Yanacopulos & Hanlon 2006:18). And of the contemporary peace treaties 
concluded or ceasefires agreed, almost half collapse before a decade is over, with the conflict parties 
relapsing back into violence and war23. 
23 Post-conflict situations are fragile; in the past around 40 percent of  them have reverted to violence within a decade. 
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Civilian Casualties Up
Of even greater concern is the rising cost of armed violence to civilians. In the course of the 20th 
century, some 110 million people are estimated to have been killed in wars2, but the percentage of 
civilians killed increased from 10 percent at the beginning of the century to perhaps as high as 90 
percent at the end2. That would conservatively translate into 130 civilians killed each day of the 
century we just left behind! These statistics, of course, don’t tell us the scale of senseless, needless 
human suffering; they cannot begin to measure the human cost of life-long disability, trauma, guilt, 
sorrow and anger. 
Greater civilian casualties are in part due to the changed nature of wars. The so-called ‘new wars’ 
are increasingly intra-state, of relatively low-intensity, lasting ten times longer than international 
conflicts, and less noticed by the world at large, especially by dominant powers and media. But of 
course not less noticed by the victims themselves!  
Table 3) Development of armed conflicts
Source: Human Security Centre (200)
This lesson of history has profound implications for the way we organize peace. Unless from 
now on we truly embrace and act on the new motto: Si vis pacem, para pacem! If you desire peace, 
prepare (for) peace!, our future would certainly look bleak! 
Let me hasten to add that there is some good news from the global peace front. According to the 
Human Security Report 200, over the past twenty years, since the end of the Cold War, the number 
of wars and war fatalities has come down26. This historic reduction is variously attributed to more 
active diplomacy, better mediation, more military peacekeeping and the spread of democracy.
In total these reversions account for around half  of  all the world’s civil wars. See Collier 2009:75.
24 Weiss & Daws 2007:11; Smith 2003:38-39. This conservative figure excludes the war-related deaths of  the first 
decade of  the 21st century. Despite death’s finality, there are great variations in statistics, in part due to differences in 
definition.
25 See Human Security Report 2008/9. In some cases, the Report says, the ratio of  indirect to direct deaths is higher than 
10:1. Indirect deaths––the hidden cost of  war-- is one of  its two main themes.
26 The Human Security Report 2005 and Human Security Brief  2007 report declining world trends of  global violence from 
the early 1990s to 2003 and beyond. More specifically, it reports major worldwide declines in the number of  armed 
conflicts, genocides, human rights abuses, military coups and international crises, as well as in the number of  battle-
related deaths per armed conflict. See also smith 2008:58. War-related fatalities as a percentage of  the population in earlier 
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Even so, far too many civilians still get killed and the potential for future violent conflict remains 
high due to growing ethnic tension2, competition for scarce resources, the nefarious trade in— 
and ubiquitous presence of— small arms28, growing population pressure and widening income 
disparities—all exacerbated by the effects of climate change. The world of the 21st century is likely 
to be much more dangerous, not less than the one just past.
Peacekeeping: A Missing Link
How does peacekeeping fit in here? We already concluded that the world has been far more 
successful at peacemaking (that is: all the diplomatic negotiations and mediation work that results in 
signing peace treaties) than we have been about peacebuilding (that is, solving conflicts, addressing 
their deep causes). But peacemaking is only the very beginning. And what we have been critically 
short of is deliberate peacekeeping efforts (that is: stopping the war and deterring violence during 
fragile ceasefires, stabilizing the environment, and beginning peace processes during these brief war-
free periods). Effective, appropriate peacekeeping, ranging from ceasefire monitoring and verification 
to more robust engagement, but also always with a much sharper focus on the special protection 
needs of civilians—is one critically missing link between peacemaking and peacebuilding.
The term ‘peacekeeping’ usually conjures up images of UN-sponsored, armed Blue Helmets 
deployed in areas of violent conflict in poor countries. Armed, military peacekeeping is currently 
indeed the dominant paradigm, the UN’s own invention not mentioned or foreseen in the UN 
Charter, a “great experiment in conflict control”… using “soldiers without enemies” (de Cuéllar 1989). 
So, altogether, peacekeeping is a new concept and practice. But while UN peacekeeping has suddenly 
become much more important, and the world expects more of it, it has also become much more 
controversial, for several reasons. 
Limits to Armed Peacekeeping
First, its very size. Over 11,000 armed peacekeepers are serving today in 1 different conflicts29. 
With Darfur and possibly Somalia added, numbers will rise to well over 120,000. This poses a 
daunting logistical and management challenge. Consider that the UN’s ‘Pentagon equivalent’ 
consists of a mere 2 crowded floors in the NY Secretariat building! 
Consensus is growing that Blue Helmets often are simply not the appropriate instrument 
to deploy in the ‘new wars’, especially if their mandate includes civilian protection in the more 
complex missions.30 They take a long time to field, often only after mass atrocities have already been 
centuries were always higher than those during the 21st century—despite the high absolute numbers. But now even the 
absolute numbers seem to be going down. 
27 As Johan Galtung points out, there are about 2000 distinct ethnic groups living within some 200 sovereign states: 
what if  the principle of  self-determination was more widely adopted?
28 According to the UN, since 1990 the small arms trade has fueled close to fifty wars around the world, especially 
(though not only) in Africa (see Naim 2006:15) 
29 As stated on the UN/DPKO website, “Although the military remain the backbone of  most peacekeeping operations, 
the many faces of  peacekeeping now include administrators and economists, police officers and legal experts, de-miners 
and electoral observers, human rights monitors and specialists in civil affairs and governance, humanitarian workers 
and experts in communications and public information”. But direct human protection that is largely community-based 
(or even focused on individuals) is much less part of  the UN peacekeeping practice. 
30 See e.g. several articles from the Global Policy Institute (http://www.globalpolicy.org); also PBS video Can the U.N. 
Keep the Peace (http://video.pbs.org/video/1146753456/feature/62). 
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committed. Carrying guns does not always make it easy to establish informal relations with local 
communities, to win hearts and minds. Concerns have also been expressed that their high cost (well 
over US$8 billion per year) has not yielded commensurate returns. And if you add to that the well-
publicized cases of sexual abuse and exploitation by these forces then it is clear why the UN is in 
soul-searching mode over its peacekeeping operations.
The Case for Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping
Therefore, I will now describe, and make the case for, another type of peacekeeping, one in 
which civil society organizations deploy unarmed civilian peacekeepers to deter violence and human 
rights violations in situations of violent conflict. Unarmed civilian peacekeeping has two principal, 
complementary components: monitoring agreements (which includes ceasefires, peace treaties, 
human rights and international humanitarian law) and protecting civilians (through proactive and 
conscious presence, close to where threatened, vulnerable people live. Unarmed peacekeeping uses 
methods that have proven to be effective. For example, providing protective accompaniment of 
individuals or groups under threat. Or creating neutral safe spaces for local people to engage in 
sustainable conflict resolution and peace-building. Or monitoring local ceasefires and verifying 
human rights violations, always in close coordination with the authorities and local peace monitors 
on the ground. Or rumor control to prevent conflict escalation. Or strengthening local early warning 
systems to spot imminent violence outbreaks and arrange for quick preventive responses. Or even 
sometimes inter-positioning between conflict parties. 
There is an important niche for this work, which can be undertaken during almost any stage of 
the conflict cycle, but is most effective early on when mediation and peacemaking are in progress, 
or later, when a ceasefire or peace treaty has been concluded, or before, during and after critical 
elections (see Nonviolent Peaceforce Feasibility Study, Schweitzer et al 2001). 
Please note that it is not only people in military uniform who are working to keep the peace. 
Many civilians and organizations, all over the world, are convinced that they, too, can contribute 
to practical peacekeeping. What distinguishes their work from ‘normal’ armed peacekeeping is 
that they are always unarmed, operating as an impartial, non-partisan ‘international third-party 
presence’, always working on the invitation of, and in close cooperation with, local civil society 
organizations, and always with the consent of all conflict parties. This approach was pioneered and 
refined, over the past three decades, by many civil society peace organizations, but almost always 
on a very small scale31. It should be noted that intergovernmental organizations (like the OSCE, EU 
and the UN) have also fielded unarmed missions with civilians32, but they differ in mandate and 
31 In addition to the well-known Peace Brigades International (which had significant presence in Guatemala , El 
Salvador, Colombia, Indonesia), there were: Christian Peacemaker Teams (Palestine, Iraq, USA, Canada); Witness for 
Peace (Nicaragua); International Brigadistas (Nicaragua); Fellowship of  Reconciliation (Colombia); Sipaz (Mexico); 
Balkan Peace Teams; Bantay Ceasefire (Mindanao); Shanti Sena (Gujarat); Gulf  Peace Team; Cry for Justice (Haiti); 
EMPSA (Ecumenical Monitoring Project South Africa); GIPP (Grassroots Initiative to Protect Palestinians); EAPPI 
(Ecumenical Accompaniment Programme in Palestine/Israel); Women’s International Peace Service (Palestine). 
Nonviolent Peaceforce, established in 2002, is the only global civil society organization that aims to take their lessons 
and best practices to scale.
32 To avoid confusion, it should be clarified that when the UN/DPKO speaks of  civilian UN peacekeepers, they refer 
almost always to a category of  technical assistance workers who deal with issues such as transitional justice, interim 
administration, police training, logistics, communications, etc.—not the kind of  direct human protection provided by 
unarmed civilian peacekeepers, including the Nonviolent Peaceforce. Meanwhile, UNHCR and UNHCHR, but also 
UNICEF and UNWRA, each within their own protection mandates, do employ staff  to provide civilian protection 
services (for refugees, human rights defenders, children and Palestinian civilians, respectively), but except for UNHCR, 
most of  their field work consists of  advisory services, monitoring compliance with international instruments and 
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method from initiatives by global civil society organizations working hand in hand with local civil 
society organizations.
How Can Unarmed Be Effective?
The question could be asked: Why would such unarmed teams be able to deter violence and 
human rights violations? Experts point out that in situations of violent conflict, all parties have 
multiple sensitivities, vulnerabilities and points of leverage, and international ‘presence’ tacitly 
activates those sensitivities (see Mahony 2006:13pp). A conflict party naturally wants to look better 
than its opponents. Moreover, all conflict parties have several good reasons to pay attention to 
third parties, especially outsiders: first, because their personal or political reputation is at stake; 
second, because they want to avoid blame or retribution; and finally, because of individual moral 
concerns. Civilian peacekeepers want to work together with all parties to stop and prevent human 
rights abuses and violations of agreements, in dialogue with all concerned. Therefore, the leverage 
unarmed peacekeepers have is mostly through personal persuasion, and this operates particularly in 
the space between the grassroots and the higher national levels. 
It is easy to dismiss unarmed peacekeeping as some kind of wooly-headed idealism or naïve 
pacifism, or a romantic notion, or even as something only suited for the weak and the timid. 
Seldom do we examine our deepest beliefs about power: namely that it grows out of the barrel of 
a gun, that there is only one kind of power—‘threat power’. As Theodore Roszak put it, “people try 
nonviolence for a week, and when ‘it does not work’, they go back to violence which hasn’t worked for 
centuries” (199). 
But unarmed peacekeeping is a form of ‘soft power’, benign and humble but hard-nosed, working 
in solidarity with threatened civilians. It aims to influence all conflict parties to comply with human 
rights and international humanitarian law standards. It is based on intelligent human relationships 
which impartial peacekeepers build and maintain with all the conflict parties. Therefore, unarmed 
peacekeeping is a subtle but effective force, requiring courageous hard work by well-networked 
professionals operating in a low-key, disciplined fashion in often challenging field conditions. There 
is nothing glamorous about this work, but that does not make it any less valuable. Moreover, it is 
done at a much lower cost than the armed military variety of peacekeeping operations. 
Economies of Peace
The huge costs of war and violent conflict, both in human and economic terms, might finally 
bring us collectively to our senses.  Paul Collier has estimated the economic consequences of war in 
developing countries, and also the benefits of well-considered responses. He calculates that the total 
national and regional cost of a single war, on average, is more than US$ 6 billion. Further global 
impacts include international terrorism, production of hard drugs, and the spread of HIV/AIDS—
which are not easily quantifiable. He concludes33 that a US$  billion investment in international 
advocacy—not direct protection services at scale for threatened individuals and communities or especially vulnerable 
target groups in situations of  violent conflict. Outside the UN system it is the ICRC, a unique organization basing itself  
on the Geneva Conventions, that has provided large-scale protection services in crises situations for many decades. 
Clearly, there is a need for ad hoc on-the-groun http://video.pbs.org/video/1146753456/feature/62d coordination 
of  efforts, although, given the massive unmet need for protection, a quantum increase in the number of  full-time 
protection field workers remains an urgent requirement and opportunity.
33 It should be noted that their reference to peacekeeping is of  the armed, military variety.
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peacekeeping and well-targeted, conflict-sensitive aid would yield a return of US$ 39 billion in 
selected post-conflict countries—a huge pay-off for preventing conflicts from going violent! (see 
Collier & Hoeffler 200). 
That is precisely why the Copenhagen Consensus included it as one of ten ‘best buys’ for 
development if the world wanted to spend another US$0 billion (see Collier, Chauvet & Hegre 
2008). And an international panel of experts3, estimating the financial value of peace, has recently 
calculated an overall positive annual economic impact of a cessation of violence worldwide of 
US$.2 trillion, with US$.8 trillion of new business created each year (and a loss of US$2. trillion 
in violence-dependent economic activity, namely by “industries that create or manage violence”). In 
short, peace is far more profitable for all than war for some! 
Kofi Annan summed it all up well when he said: “The cost of peacekeeping, peacemaking and 
peacebuilding pales into insignificance compared with the cost and consequences of violent conflict and 
war” (Annan 2002). 
A New Peace Role for Global Civil Society
And this is what the former UN Secretary-General said about the role of civil society in conflict 
prevention : “I look to civil society to act as our partners in helping to defuse potential conflicts. As 
experience tells us, you will be most effective by coordinating with bilateral and intergovernmental actors— 
and with one another. As civil society organizations, you have a vital role to play. You are uniquely 
placed: to facilitate local conflict resolution; to champion human rights; to mobilize public support for 
peace settlements; and to build trust to encourage healing and reconciliation” (Annan 200). 
Creating a large, multinational professional reserve force of unarmed civilian peacekeepers would 
indeed have significant advantages for the international community, UN agencies and donors. It 
could offer a quick, non-bureaucratic response to local requests for help. It would offer round-the-
clock dedicated protective presence, not distracted by other duties. It would not be subject to UN 
security phases. It would not entail a compromise of sovereignty. And if timely deployed, such a 
force could potentially even be effective in preventing crimes of mass atrocities.
Not Last, But Early Resort
Deployment of unarmed civilian peacekeeping may well follow most of the criteria the UN 
applies when mandating its Blue Helmets under UN Charter Chapter VI: gravity and urgency 
(preventing large-scale, imminent loss of life); right intention (to halt or avert human suffering); 
acceptability (with consent of conflict parties); proportional means (scale and scope are minimum 
necessary); reasonable prospects (action likely to be more successful than inaction). But it would 
differ with regard to the use of force (even in self defense or as measure of last resort) because it 
would always be unarmed; moreover, it would always also be on the invitation of requesting civil 
society partners; and finally, it could mobilize much earlier in the conflict cycle, to enable much 
more preventive action, long before large-scale loss of life could become a reality.  
The world has too often failed to protect civilians threatened by genocide and ethnic cleansing. 
While unarmed civilian peacekeeping obviously cannot stop many of these atrocities, it is one 
34 This information comes from the Global Peace Index 2009, Institute for Economics and Peace, (see www.visionof  
humanity.org). It includes the estimates derived from models made by the Economists for Peace & Security (Levy 
Institute, New York).
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highly appropriate first response to prevent, contain and manage violent conflict, and to prevent 
escalation, and to enable the conduct of further preventive local, national or even international 
diplomacy. It therefore has the potential to contribute to the prevention of these kinds of atrocities 
further down the road. Civilian peacekeepers can work in partnership with local communities to 
contribute to the protection of all civilians—mainly children, women and the elderly, refugees and 
internally displaced persons, demobilized child soldiers, human rights workers, humanitarian aid 
workers, journalists, and others caught somewhere in the conflict cycle. 
That way unarmed civilian peacekeeping could also become an antidote against the general 
sense of powerlessness, resignation and cynicism in the face of violent conflict, including ethnic 
cleansing and genocide.
The UN always maintains that its use of military force is a measure of ‘last resort’. Likewise, the 
Security Council often authorizes ‘all necessary means’ to maintain peace and prevent violent conflict. 
To them we say: unarmed civilian peacekeepers are a low-cost, subtle force for peace, and make 
them an important addition to the peace-builder’s toolbox. It is our hope that the international 
community will avail itself of this new tool, through predictable long-term funding, once its value is 
more widely appreciated. The OECD’s Development Assistance Committee has already broadened 
its definition of ODA to include activities such as unarmed civilian peacekeeping3.
Conclusion
Let me conclude. Many millions of civilians all over the world find themselves caught in conflict 
cycles and trapped in war, facing unprecedented hardship and injustice. The humanitarian reflex 
and response is to provide material relief. Such relief is necessary, but it alone is not sufficient. 
Direct human protection is equally essential! But how? 
We have seen that armed peacekeeping is possible, sometimes necessary, but also often not 
effective enough—especially in the so-called new wars. We are all witnessing the limits of meeting 
violence with only armed, military means. Meanwhile the world of civilians needs much more, not 
less human protection. 
Fortunately, civilian protection has, at last, moved up on the world agenda. In this decade it has 
become an important topic in the global discourse on human security and protection36. 
In this presentation we have argued that international ‘presence’ itself confers protection, especially 
when done consciously and proactively, in combination with national and local organizations and 
people. Unarmed peacekeeping is now a newly available force for peace. The world can ill afford to 
ignore its great potential. 
35 The 2005 decision by the Development Assistance Committee of  the OECD to expand the definition of  Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) to include, among other things, “enhancing civil society’s role in the security 
system” and “civilian activities for peacebuilding, conflict prevention and conflict resolution” makes unarmed civilian 
peacekeeping activities in principle eligible for donor funding.
36In addition to Geneva Conventions and ICRC reports, several significant reports may be mentioned here: Agenda 
for Peace (Annan 2002 and 2005), Report of  the Commission of  Global Governance (1992), Brahimi Report (2000); 
The Responsibility to Protect—Report of  the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001); 
Commission on Human Security (2003); A more secure world: Our Shared Responsibility—Report of  the Secretary-
General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004); In Larger Freedom: towards development, security and 
human rights for all—Report of  the UN Secretary General (2005); Slim & Bonwick 2005; Mahony 2006, Gowan and 
Johnstone (2007); Implementing the Responsibility to Protect—Report of  the Secretary-General, UN, New York (2009); 
Paffenholz (2009), Report of  the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of  Conflict, UN (2009); Refugees 
International (2009)
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No doubt, unarmed civilian peacekeeping faces many difficult challenges and dilemmas. No 
one says it’s going to be easy. But the benefits of even partial success are fully worth the effort, both 
in human, economic and societal terms. 
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Best Practices for Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping 
By Tim Wallis
Theoretical Background
After more than 0 years of peace theory and peace research, it is generally accepted that for any 
conflict there are three fundamental aspects; the attitudes, or enemy images, hatreds and animosities 
that fuel conflict; the behaviours, or the actions that people take to inflict damage on their enemies, 
mainly in the form of violence; and the causes, or conditions, which led to the conflict in the first 
place. Without understanding and dealing with all three of these aspects, it‘s very hard to handle a 
conflict effectively. 
Table 4) The Conflict Triangle
See Galtung 1996
Corresponding to the three fundamental aspects of conflict, we have three strategies or three 
aspects of handling conflict: peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding. 
The peacemaking aspect of handling conflict refers to the A point on the triangle: the attitudes. 
Peacemaking is about getting people together to sign an agreement, or getting them to decide to stop 
fighting each other. Peacemaking involves mediators, it involves dialogue, it involves reconciliation, 
and it involves trying to get people to change their attitudes so they can actually sit down and talk, 
because without talking they can‘t resolve their conflicts. 
Peacekeeping deals with the B point on the triangle. It deals with behaviour, with violence. 
Peacekeeping is about creating an environment where people are not killing each other on the 
streets and therefore there is a chance for people to sit down and talk or start to address some of the 
root causes of the conflict. Without peacekeeping it is very difficult for those other peace strategies 
to work, but peacekeeping by itself does not resolve a conflict. Peacekeeping does not bring people 
together. It does not address the causes of the conflict. All it does is try to reduce the violence, and 
create the conditions so that those other things can happen. 
The C part of the triangle, the peacebuilding, is about addressing those root causes, or conditions 
that led to the conflict in the first place. And of course without addressing those, you can‘t have any 
sustainable kind of peace, because unfortunately conflicts recur in cycles. If the parties get to the 
point of stopping the fighting and sitting down and making a peace agreement, but the root causes 
of the conflict are not addressed, the chances of that conflict just starting up again in any form or 
time or place are very high. 
26
Christine Schweitzer -  Civilian Peacekeeping
Table 5) Three Aspects of Handling Conflict
Primacy of Local Actors
The people in the conflict, including the conflict actors but also all the people caught up in the 
conflict who may not have allegiance to one side or the other, are ultimately the only ones who 
can resolve that conflict. Nobody from outside can impose a solution and expect it to last, because 
people need to buy into a solution, they need to understand it, and they need to know that it‘s 
in their best interests. That is why the peacemaking process is so critical and why that is basically 
about the parties sitting down and talking and resolving their own differences - working out their 
own solutions. 
At the same time there are roles for outsiders to play in most conflict situations. Sometimes 
people simply can‘t or won’t talk to each other, so having a mediator can be crucial to get the process 
started. This is an outside person who can bring the people together, somebody neutral who can 
help people think through the issues and begin to listen to the other side of the story. A mediator 
from outside the conflict may be able to gain the trust and respect and confidence of the parties 
sufficiently to get them to sit down, calm down, and start thinking about solutions. 
Similarly, the peacebuilding work of addressing root causes can also benefit from outsiders. 
These outsiders can contribute through capacity building, supplying of resources, or offering other 
kinds of support. Building a lasting and sustainable peace is still something that must come from 
within the communities that have suffered the conflict, but often they do not have the resources 
available to do that and so, once again, outside support can be beneficial. 
When it comes to peacekeeping, it is assumed that this is largely a role for outsiders, like the 
UN. However here too there needs to be a recognition that ultimately it is the people in that 
situation who must keep their own peace. When violence is severe and people are killing each other 
or have good reason to assume that killing will go on, outside intervention can be very helpful. So 
there is a role for outsiders to play here, but it needs to be understood that this role is within an 
overall context where the local people must be in charge of the process that will lead to a sustainable 
peace.
Typology of Civilian Peacekeeping Options
Most people when they think of peacekeeping think of the UN Blue Helmets, in other words 
of military peacekeeping. With over 100,000 Blue Helmets deployed in 18 countries around the 
world, it is not surprising that this is the dominant model of what peacekeeping has come to mean. 
However, even within these military peacekeeping operations there are more and more roles being 
played by civilians. The EU, for instance, as one of the newer actors in this field, places more 
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reliance on (armed) police officers than on military troops for its peacekeeping operations. Almost 
one quarter of all staff deployed on UN peacekeeping missions are in fact now civilians, including 
not just drivers and translators but human rights officers, democratization officers, election officers, 
(civilian) protection officers and so on.
1. Unarmed Military 
There are also unarmed military operations. In fact, the very first ‘peacekeeping’ type of operation 
conducted by the UN (before the term ‘peacekeeping’ was coined), which was in Palestine in 198, 
was unarmed. UNTSO (United Nations Truce Supervision Organization) consisted of unarmed 
military observers, essentially a military operation but without weapons. 
All UN military observer missions since then have been unarmed (or only lighted armed), 
although the personnel are serving military officers. Other non-UN observer and monitoring 
missions have followed a similar format, such as the SLMM (Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission) in Sri 
Lanka and the IMT (International Monitoring Team) in the Philippines, using unarmed military 
officers from several countries to monitor a cease-fire. There have also been examples, for instance 
in Bougainville in the Pacific, where the parties agreed to have an outside military force come in to 
maintain the peace, but they didn‘t want weapons and so those peacekeeping troops, in this case 
from New Zealand, were entirely unarmed. 
2. Police
Recently, there are more and more police missions doing peacekeeping work. These police are 
sometimes armed, and they are sometimes considered military (or uniformed) operations, but also 
sometimes considered civilian operations. There are a large number of police maintaining law and 
order in Bosnia, for instance, who arrived initially under the UN flag, and now operate under the 
EU flag. In many cases these are roles which up until recently would have been played by military, 
but which are now being played by police.
3. Unarmed Civilians With an Official Mandate
There are many examples of unarmed civilians also doing peacekeeping work. When I talk 
about unarmed civilians in this context, I am referring to non-uniformed personnel, ie. not police 
or military. 
In this first category I am referring to unarmed civilians working on behalf of official 
organizations, including the UN. Increasingly civilians are playing roles as human rights monitors, 
election monitors, and protection officers. Sometimes this happens as part of UN peacekeeping 
missions that are a combination of civilian and military. But there have also been a number of 
peacekeeping missions that have been purely civilian.
The largest organization in the world that is running purely civilian peacekeeping operations 
is the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). They do not refer to their 
operations as peacekeeping, however they involve border monitoring, ceasefire monitoring, ‘civilian 
crisis management’, maintainance of law and order, protection of civilians and of human rights 
and so on. Over the past 20 years, the OSCE has been sending very effective, purely civilian, 
peacekeeping missions to Eastern Europe, the Balkans, the Baltic states, and the Caucasus. For 
instance on the border between Chechnya and Georgia, for many years the OSCE had a monitoring 
post, with civilians sitting in watchtowers, monitoring the border and reporting activities going on 
there, such as any movement of soldiers. 
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This category of unarmed civilian missions with official mandates also includes UN agencies 
with a specific protection mandate, such as UNHCR (UN High Commission for Refugees) and 
UNHCHR (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights), as well as UNICEF, which has 
a protection mandate on behalf of children. Increasingly other UN agencies, including World Food 
Programme, are playing a protection and peacekeeping role in places where they may have exclusive 
access to vulnerable populations. 
The ICRC (International Committee for the Red Cross) also serves a very critical function in 
conflict situations. They have a very specific mandate going back the to the Geneva Conventions, 
which gives  them a special role to play in protection of civilians, monitoring of ceasefires, 
investigation of abuses of human rights in prisons, in detention camps and so on. 
4. Unarmed Civilians From Civil Society
There have also been many situations where unarmed civilians without an official mandate, or 
sometimes without any official role or function at all, have been able to play an important part in 
reducing violence and protecting civilians. This category includes a whole range of humanitarian 
NGO‘s that are often on the front line in conflict situations, working with IDPs, with refugees, 
or with resettled communities. Oftentimes these NGO workers are the first ones there, the first 
ones to make sure that things are being done properly, that people are safe, that the parties are not 
attacking each other, and that space is made for humanitarian corridors to let food aid in and things 
like that.
There are also journalists who have sometimes played a critical role as outside observers, 
monitoring the situation and enabling the parties to know that they‘re being watched. There are 
also election monitors who help reduce violence and tensions around elections, which in a post-
conflict situation can be a highly de-stabilising moment. And there are organizations like Amnesty 
International and Human Rights Watch, who may send in delegations to monitor or to investigate 
abuses or allegations of human rights violations and may play a role in protecting civilians and 
reducing violence in those circumstances. 
And there are solidarity movements playing this role in many countries. For instance in Palestine, 
there are a large number of groups who send people from different countries to come and help the 
Palestinians harvest their olive crops, or who will go with them to their farms, or go with them 
through checkpoints.
5. Unarmed Civilians With Special Skills and Training
The final category I want to talk about, of people playing this role, are unarmed civilians 
from civil society, but with specific skills and experiences, and with specific training, who operate 
according to certain principles, and who follow certain international standards. These are unarmed 
civilians who are specifically trained and prepared to play a peacekeeping role and I will highlight 
some specific examples of this below. 
Why Are the Military Used For Peacekeeping?
Before looking at what civilians can and cannot do as peacekeepers, the question arises as to why 
up to now peacekeeping has been predominantly done by the military. Obviously there are many 
benefits to using military in certain situations. For one thing, they are very good at the logistics side 
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of things. They can fly people into a conflict area, they‘ve got all the right equipment, they have 
excellent communications systems, and they know how to live under harsh conditions. 
Almost every country in the world has a standing army that is predominantly (and ideally!) 
idle much of the time. So these are useful and available people to be deployed in an emergency, 
and it‘s easy to send them almost anywhere at a moment’s notice. Furthermore, the cost of actually 
deploying those forces tends to remain hidden because the costs of maintaining a standing army 
are already built into national budgets and the additional cost of deploying them somewhere on 
a peacekeeping mission is marginal compared to the huge expensive of having them, and all their 
equipment, in the first place.
Over the last 0 years of peacekeeping, when it has been successful, it has not been the tanks or 
the machine guns that have kept the peace. In fact these have been rarely used. It‘s been the blue 
helmets themselves that kept the peace, or rather, what they represent. Soldiers on UN peacekeeping 
missions represent the UN; they represent the international community; they represent world 
public opinion. That‘s what gives them the authority, or the power, to actually keep the parties 
from fighting each other, to keep the environment safe for civilians, and to create the conditions for 
peacemaking and peacebuilding activities. It is not the weapons, or the fact that they are soldiers, 
that makes them effective. 
And when we draw this out a bit further, it becomes rather obvious that actually there are many 
things needed for peacekeeping that military troops cannot do, or that unarmed civilians can do far 
better. 
What Unarmed Civilians Can Do
Unarmed civilians can first of all gain the trust of the parties to the conflict, and can usually 
do this more effectively than military personnel, although admittedly not in all contexts. Unarmed 
civilians who have the training, experience, and people skills to establish those relationships of trust 
are the most effective at doing so, and this is the first critical step in any peacekeeping work, because 
without those trust relationships with each of the parties, other aspects of peacekeeping work are 
not possible. 
Gaining access to physical locations is the next important thing in peacekeeping. Military forces 
can do this when they have a specific mandate to do so, but as long as the parties trust the unarmed 
civilians and other factors are also present (which I‘ll discuss below), the parties will provide access 
to places which people would otherwise assume you need military force to gain access to. And 
access based on trust is far more reliable than access based on the use or threat of force.
As an example of this I will tell a story from Bosnia. In the early 1990s, Col. Bob Stewart was 
the commander of UNPROFOR forces (UN peacekeepers) in Bosnia. He was leading a column of 
UNPROFOR tanks, trying to get into a village. They were stopped at a Bosnian Serb checkpoint 
and refused access. Now this man is in charge of military forces and he has a huge column of tanks 
behind him. He had all the military force he could possibly  want. And yet he was being stopped 
by a few soldiers at a checkpoint who were telling him he couldn‘t go through. Now, he had a very 
short time to make a decision whether to fight his way through, which could have involved not 
just casualties among the soldiers at the checkpoint, but also could have had repercussions in the 
area. There could have been reprisals against civilians. It could have led to a restarting of the war. 
All those factors are at play if you start fighting, so he couldn‘t really risk fighting his way through 
this checkpoint. So what he did was call the BBC! He told them to come to the checkpoint and 
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start filming and interviewing the soldiers at the checkpoint. And within minutes the soldiers had 
capitulated and said ‘OK, you can go through’. 
That demonstrates the power, not just of the BBC, but of unarmed civilians in general, in this 
case journalists. Sometimes even the most powerful army on earth is impotent in a situation like 
that. It takes unarmed civilians to create a different dynamic to the one of brute force that people 
are used to in wartime. In fact there are so many other tools and methods out there, that are able to 
influence, put pressure, convince, and ultimately to deter people from doing certain things.
Another example is from Nicaragua, during the 1980‘s, just after the Contra war started. There 
were Contra attacks on villages along the border with Honduras. A group of Americans went down 
there in 1983 to see for themselves because the American government was funding the Contras, so 
they went down to see what their government was doing. And when they got to this border village 
there were no attacks. So they said we want to see the attacks and the results of what the Contras 
are doing, and the villagers told them, well as long as you‘re here they‘re not going to attack us. 
So the group from the US said, ‘oh, if that‘s really the case, then we‘ll stay here and we‘ll get more 
people, and we‘ll stop them attacking you!’ And so over the next seven years, an organization called 
Witness for Peace sent over ,000 American citizens down to Nicaragua, to just be in these villages 
on the border. And the Contras, because they were being funded by the US government, could not 
risk killing an American citizen, and so stopped attacking those villages. So this was a very effective 
way of actually deterring violence, simply by their presence there. 
A similar dynamic has been going on in Palestine for many years. People discovered that 
whenever someone foreign was at a checkpoint, the Israeli soldiers would behave differently towards 
the Palestinians trying to get across. When no one is there, they can refuse Palestinians access to 
their farmland, they can refuse them to go home, or even refuse them to take people to hospital. But 
as soon as someone is watching, they behave differently. It‘s been proven time and time again. 
So unarmed civilians can gain the trust of the parties, they can gain access, they can monitor the 
situation, they can encourage the parties to stick to the agreements that they‘ve made. And that‘s 
where ceasefire monitoring and similar activities come in, where people say we are not going to 
move our troops, we are not going to attack this area, and we are not going to deploy weapons to 
this area.  If people are watching, this encourages people to stick to their agreements. But they can 
also literally reduce the violations and abuses of human rights, as I have just described in Palestine 
and Nicaragua. 
Even the most bloodthirsty, ruthless dictator doesn‘t want to be seen doing things that they 
shouldn‘t, and doesn‘t want to get caught doing those things.
Peace Brigades International (PBI) was working in Guatemala in the early 1980‘s, trying to 
stop disappearances and assassinations of human rights groups and people promoting peace and 
democracy in Guatemala. These groups were struggling against the military dictatorship at the time 
-- the generals that were in power, all their underlings, and the death squads that were operating 
underground. One of these groups was called GAM, a mutual protection and support group, and 
they had three of their leaders assassinated in quick succession in 1983. Then Peace Brigades started 
accompanying their leaders, 2 hours a day, with people from North America and Europe. And 
from that moment on, no-one was killed in GAM. In fact one of the leaders of GAM at that time 
is now in the Guatemalan Congress and has publicly stated that she owes her life to PBI. So that‘s 
a very inspiring example of how civilians can provide this kind of protection, and reduce human 
rights abuses and attacks. 
But the really fascinating part of this story is that two researchers from PBI went back to 
Guatemala 10 years later, and interviewed those very generals that they were trying to protect 
these people from. They learnt a great deal about the thinking behind the strategies of the military 
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dictatorship, why they behaved in certain ways, and the kind of effect that they felt from this 
international presence of unarmed civilians.
So we‘ve learnt a lot from those experiences. We‘ve learnt that unarmed civilians can not only 
encourage parties to stick to agreements or stop attacks and abuses, but also they can play a major 
role in building confidence and stabilizing the situation, because they encourage civilians and civil 
society organizations to be more proactive, to be more daring, to actually work on the peacemaking 
and peacebuilding activities that otherwise they‘re afraid to do. So it works from both directions. 
It‘s both about trying to reduce the violence and attacks from taking place, and also about trying 
to encourage, support, and build confidence in people to take more responsibility for their own 
situation, because the role of violence in these kinds of situations is often to inhibit, prevent, and 
scare people away from taking action and playing a stronger role in their own situation.
What Unarmed Civilians Cannot Do
Unarmed civilians cannot stop spoilers and determined actors from one party or the other, 
who want to carry on fighting. In situations like Bosnia or Chechnya, where there are snipers 
shooting people, even targeting internationals, where there are cities under siege, or shelling of 
civilian targets, in those kinds of situations, there‘s absolutely nothing that an unarmed civilian can 
do, directly, to stop those kinds of actors and those kinds of behaviours. Now, that‘s not to say that 
military peacekeepers can stop those things either. 
Neither military nor unarmed civilians can ‘guarantee’ to protect civilians. There are many 
examples where UN or other military forces have been unable to protect civilian populations, the 
most notorious cases being Rwanda, where the UN stood by as nearly 1 million people were killed 
and Srebrenica, where UN peacekeeping forces were unable to stop the massacre of 6,000 civilians, 
despite them being protected by a so-called UN ‘safe haven’. So whether it is military or civilian 
peacekeepers that are deployed, there are certain conditions that need to be in place, and there are 
certain situations where neither are likely to be effective. 
Unarmed civilian peacekeeping is much more preventative in terms of trying to work with 
parties and convince them not to do things in the first place, but once they are already doing those 
things, it is very difficult for unarmed civilians to stop them. Militaries can, in theory, ‘force’ the 
parties to stop fighting. But then we‘re moving quite a ways away from the peacekeeping role 
defined above, and more into the war fighting role, which unfortunately has become very confused 
because of recent ‘peacekeeping’ actions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Fighting wars and trying to win 
them is a very different thing from trying to create peace, and obviously civilians are not very good 
at fighting and winning wars. 
How Civilian Peacekeeping is Done
Building relationships of building trust and confidence is the foundation of civilian peacekeeping. 
Without that, we cannot be effective. That also goes for military peacekeeping, but obviously the 
military do that in a different way. Sometimes military commanders have a certain respect for other 
military commanders of the same rank, and will listen to them. Sometimes civilians have a more 
difficult time in gaining that credibility. But in most circumstances a civilian poses less threat and 
has less of agenda to get in the way of building the trust and so it is far easier for civilians to build 
effective relationships. 
32
Christine Schweitzer -  Civilian Peacekeeping
The second most important element of peacekeeping is a careful analysis of the situation, 
knowing what is happening. Without the analysis, it is possible (and it has happened) that civilians 
can make the situation worse rather than better. They can inadvertently end up giving support to one 
side instead of the other. They can make serious mistakes that actually lead to people being killed. 
Careful analysis is absolutely critical for this work, because it means knowing who is threatening 
whom and why. Sometimes, in the Philippines for instance, the apparent breakdown of a ceasefire, 
or an apparent ceasefire violation, may actually be taking place because of a local feud between 
different clans in that area. Unless you understand the dynamics that are involved in that situation, 
you can misinterpret what is going on and help to escalate the situation rather than de-escalate it. 
The purpose of analyzing the situation, building relationships, and then using all these 
relationships of different kinds with different people, is to try to influence other people. And this 
is where the crux of the effectiveness of civilian peacekeeping comes in. Because people, as I said, 
do not want to be seen doing the wrong thing. If they can get away with it, without being caught, 
or without other repercussions, then they might well do it. But if there are consequences (and it 
doesn‘t take a completely rational interpretation of behaviour to realize that), people do weigh up 
the costs and benefits of undertaking particular actions. If a guerilla movement or a government 
army, or the politicans behind those people, determine that getting rid of certain people quietly and 
discreetly is a lot more cost effective, and a lot easier than trying to deal with them legally through 
the courts, that is very different than if there are consequences to that kind of activity and people 
know that there are consequences. And those consequences can be purely about their own stature 
in their own community, or in their own organization, it can be about their relationship with other 
people in that organization, it can be about their standing in the community and in the group at 
large that is supporting them. 
No organization exists in a vacuum, and these people need to take these things into calculation 
all the time, and there are ways of influencing that. So the way civilian peacekeeping works is by 
understanding those webs and chains of influence, and understanding and working with people, 
and having good relationships with people somewhere along that web so that those people can help 
to influence other people. And through the influence, you try to get people to do the right thing 
and to stop doing the wrong thing. It is very simply and it is surprisingly effective. But there are 
principles and other factors that determine how effective it is, so we need to look at those as well.
Underlying Principles That Determine Degree of Success 
1. Nonpartisanship, independence, and being international
One absolute fundamental of this work is neutrality or more strictly, ‘nonpartisanship’. The Red 
Cross is neutral in the sense that they don‘t take sides in a conflict, they don‘t play any role in that 
conflict, and as a result, in theory they don‘t do anything to encourage or undermine either party. 
That is a very restricted mandate which does not suit most other organizations, so there is also the 
term “impartiality.” Most humanitarian agencies say that they are impartial, rather than neutral. By 
this they mean that they deliver aid or other services according to need, and not according to any 
political agenda, regardless of who may be in the ‘right’ or in the ‘wrong’. 
Nonpartisanship is a more nuanced term, used by civilian peacekeeping organizations to 
describe the way that we have to work in these environments. We absolutely have to have the 
trust and confidence of the different parties. And the minute any party thinks that an unarmed 
civilian is collecting intelligence for the other side, or is spending more time with, or has political 
sympathies for the other side, then that‘s the end. They cannot continue doing the work because 
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the trust has been lost. This is the big difference between groups who are working more in solidarity 
with one side, such as those supporting the Palestinians, and those who are working according to 
certain basic principles of peacekeeping, that include this strict approach of nonpartisanship. The 
nonpartisanship is not only for their own safety and security, but it is critical for the relationships 
that have to be built with all kinds of actors, who are then critical for actually having an influence 
on armed actors, and therefore being able to protect people and to stop violence and abuse from 
taking place.
The same principle applies to independence and being international. Effective civilian 
peacekeeping is all about being an outside party that does not have an agenda, and can thereby gain 
the respect, trust and confidence of the different parties involved, and can thus go in and work with 
different people. That can be very difficult for people who see abuses taking place, and have natural 
sympathies for the underdogs or for the victims. However, this kind of work cannot succeed unless 
people maintain this absolute nonpartisanship.
2. Nonviolence
Unarmed civilians, by definition, are not going to be going around shooting people. Even the 
military recognizes that one of the limitations of military peacekeeping is that by sending soldiers 
onto the streets to monitor and stop the fighting, they are also reinforcing the concept that military 
force is the way to deal with problems. By putting soldiers into these situations, and thereby 
reinforcing the limiting notion that soldiers and military force are what keep the peace, the military 
can also be actually perpetuating the conflict, because as soon as the soldiers leave, they are replaced 
with the soldiers that just stopped fighting, or perhaps were even attacking the very civilians they 
are now ‘protecting’. Trying to model a different way of handling conflict, of working together, 
sitting down and talking, not using weapons or force of any kind, is about trying to present the only 
viable future out of violent conflict. Nonviolence, in this sense, is a critical component of unarmed 
civilian peacekeeping.
3. Visibility, transparency, quiet diplomacy, and cultural sensitivity
There are other principles that we have learnt from the last 2 years of civilian peacekeeping: 
about the degree of visibility of our work; about being open and honest with all the parties regarding 
what we‘re doing; about being very careful in the handling of information. Information itself in any 
conflict situation is very sensitive and delicate to manage. If one side thinks that you are collecting 
information for the other side, that can be a serious security issue. We are not able to work like 
Amnesty or Human Rights Watch, or other big campaigning organizations. If we want to work on 
the ground, we have to work in a quiet diplomatic way with people to try to address problems. We 
have to work, step by step, up the chain of command, not blaming people, not putting ourselves in 
a situation where we are seen as vilifying one side or the other. 
Also essential for success in doing unarmed civilian peacekeeping is a sensitivity to the situation 
that you are going into, and an understanding of the political connotations involved, and of cultural 
sensitivities. That is why ultimately this needs professional people with expertise in doing this kind 
of work. Journalists and solidarity workers and civilians just coming in off the street can do a certain 
amount, but they cannot do the kind of detailed peacekeeping that is being described here. 
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Lessons Learned and Ways Forward
We have learned over the past 2 years of civilian peacekeeping, that mere presence by itself is not 
enough. It can protect and save individual lives, but it cannot stop violence from erupting somewhere 
else and it will not change the underlying conditions that result in people being killed or put in 
danger. We cannot de-escalate tense situations without professionalism, discipline, specialized roles, 
training, and preparation. In addition, having a specialized NGO like the Nonviolent Peaceforce 
adds effectiveness by providing the ability to make decisions quickly, to go into situations and to 
change mandate when necessary. The ICRC or UN agencies with a protection mandate, such as 
UNHCR, who are in many of these situations in much larger numbers and have a role to play in 
reducing the violence and protecting civilians, have other roles to play as well. They are there to 
provide aid and to help refugees.
These specialized UN agencies do not have the expertise or the flexibility to go in and address 
needs that do not fit easily into their mandate. They can be very cumbersome at making decisions 
and taking actions because of the bureaucracy. And ultimately their ability to build relationships and 
use them to influence behaviour is limited by their attachment to political entitities who do have 
vested interests of their own and can interfere with the political situation in ways that undermine 
the effectiveness of peacekeeping. 
Another limitation of official bodies trying to do this work is illustrated by the example of 
Georgia. After recent fighting between Russia and Georgia, the EU is providing a peacekeeping 
presence on the border of two breakaway areas that were the source of the conflict. But because these 
breakaway areas are not recognized by the EU, it is politically impossible for the EU peacekeepers 
to go into those areas. They are restricted to the Georgian side of the border, and there is noone 
patrolling the other side. So the EU had to ask NGOs like Nonviolent Peaceforce to go to the other 
side of the border to provide protection and monitoring of what is happening on that side of the 
border, because the EU cannot go there. That is an example of where a specialized NGO can do 
work that a big official institution like the EU cannot. 
But the most important area where a specialized NGO like NP provides added value is in 
building credibility and relationships at the grassroots level. Big organizations like the EU, OSCE, 
or UN have more difficulty living and working directly with the communities at the grassroots 
level, building up the kind of trust and confidence of those communities that enable so much of 
the other peacekeeping work to take place.
Unarmed civilian peacekeeping has enormous potential. For a number of years, it has been 
tried on a small scale with startling success, but it is still largely unknown. In the future, civilian 
peacekeeping can play a much more important role in reducing violence and creating the conditions 
for effective peacemaking and peacebuilding. This is a tool of great potential. We are at the early 
stages of discovering what it can do, and it requires much more investment from governments and 
from the UN to try this, to allow it, to learn from it, to experiment, and to move forward.
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Peacekeeping with Nonviolence: Protection Strategies for Sustainable Peace 
By Rachel Julian
When we talk about ‘protecting civilians’ we mean many things from ‘Responsibility to protect’, 
to ensuring livelihoods and security. In this paper I focus on protecting civilians from direct violence 
and suggest there are benefits of this role being carried out with nonviolent strategies.
Although normally associated with the military, peacekeeping is a function that can be performed 
by civilians using nonviolent strategies and methods. Maintaining a primarily military focus on 
peacekeeping (UN Security Council 2009 and Ramsbothom & Woodhouse 200) inhibits local 
ownership of both protection and peace, and makes collaboration and cooperation with peacemaking 
and peacebuilding strategies more difficult than it could be if nonviolence was used in both short 
term protection and long term strategies.
Using nonviolence would facilitate a faster and more effective path towards a long term 
sustainable peace.
Short and long term goals 
When we aim to protect civilians from direct violence there are both short term and long term 
goals that affect any given community. In the short term we need to save lives and prevent harm, but 
in the long term we need to enable a sustainable peace to be built in the vulnerable communities.
Galtung (1963) described three ‘approaches to peace’, peacekeeping, peacemaking and 
peacebuilding. 
Miall, Ramsbottom & Woodhouse (1999:22)38 see the three approaches linked by,
“peacemaking aims to change the attitudes of the main protagonists, peacekeeping lowers the level of 
destructive behaviour, and peacebuilding tries to overcome the contradictions which lie at the root of the 
conflict”. 
In the document produced for ‘Responsibility to protect’39 the authors recognise the range of 
tools, related to the role played by military intervention,
“If military intervention is to be contemplated, the need for a post-intervention strategy is also of 
paramount importance. Military intervention is one instrument in a broader spectrum of tools designed 
to prevent conflicts and humanitarian emergencies from arising, intensifying, spreading, persisting or 
recurring. The objective of such a strategy must be to help ensure that the conditions that prompted the 
military intervention do not repeat themselves or simply resurface. ... the consolidation of peace in the 
aftermath of conflict requires more than purely diplomatic and military action ... an integrated peace 
building effort is needed to address the various factors which have caused or are threatening a conflict.”
In strategic and tactical terms, by aligning approaches and methods throughout the process of 
meeting short term and long term goals, there is a shared understanding of the values and aims, 
participants can have ownership of their peace, and it increases the likelihood of reaching the 
intended outcomes. 
37 Cited in Schweitzer 2009a:112
38 A.a.O.
39 ICISS 2001:39, cited in Rigby 2006.
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As well as Galtung’s approaches, the short and long term goals involved in taking a vulnerable 
community from fear to safety, in this case a transition from violence to sustainable peace, are 
identified in the ALNAP publication Slim and Bonwick (200:3) as:
Responsive Action
Remedial Action
Environment building
Table 6) Humanitarian Protection
Achieving a sustainable peace requires peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding (and will 
include aspects of Responsive Action, Remedial action and Environment building), but it is not 
a linear progression through them. At any one time elements of them all are likely to be taking 
pace in a situation, implemented by various agencies. To be a coherent and collaborative effort, to 
make effective progress towards peace, wherever possible all organisations and agencies should have 
common approaches and understand their roles.
Good practice in protection involves the collaboration of many agencies. If nonviolence is a 
thread that weaves amongst them, and starts to demonstrate the benefits of involving communities 
in building sustainable peace from the stage of Responsive Action or Peacekeeping, then nonviolent 
approaches will become more understood and integrated.
What is peacekeeping?
Peacekeeping is defined by the International Peace Academy0 as,
the prevention, containment, moderation, and termination of hostilities, through the 
medium of a peaceful third party intervention, organized and directed internationally, 
using multinational forces of soldiers, police, and civilians to restore and maintain 
peace,
and Schirch (2006:6) additionally notes that peacekeeping,
usually refers to attempts to reduce the amount of direct physical violence and not 
the underlying structural violence of discriminatory policies and institutions…
Peacekeeping commonly brings up an image of soldiers keeping parties to the conflict apart and 
with protection roles, but modern peacekeeping involves many different functions. Randle (2006:6) 
40 Cited in Schirch 2006:15
•
•
•
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suggests that the only peacekeeping task not able to be carried out by nonviolent peacekeepers is 
‘enforcement’, that is where,
the peacekeepers are authorized to use their weapons not just in self defence but in 
other circumstances, notably defending civilians under attack or engaging armed 
groups that are breaking the ceasefire, and sometimes more broadly to protect public 
security. 
And he suggests that,
Here the question is whether they [the unarmed peacekeepers] could provide by their 
presence and authority a reasonable measure of protection to the civilian population, 
and whether sanctions and internal civil resistance could prove sufficiently powerful 
coercive instruments when enforcement was required. (Randle 2006:6)
At present the dominant method of peacekeeping is using military forces, but peacemaking 
and peacebuilding are implemented using nonviolent strategies such as participation or ownership, 
and therefore there is an existing tension between stages of peacekeeping and peacemaking or 
peacebuilding. If we chose a nonviolent approach at the peacekeeping stage, it will enable a more 
coherent strategy throughout short and long term goals and actions.
Military peacekeeping has changed over time from traditional to third generation peace support 
operations (Ramsbothom & Woodhouse 200) and now includes many civilian functions, and 
additional activities. It is still seen as necessary to have a military component and often run as a 
military mission with civil-military cooperation necessary with non-military agencies, but there 
are nonviolent alternatives to the military component, which could reduce the tensions in the 
cooperation and collaboration tasks.
Ramsbottom & Woodhouse (200) have put forward the proposal that civilians should 
play roles in an international ‘cosmopolitan peacekeeping’ force such as mediation, and conflict 
resolution experts (as well as relief and environmental crisis experts), but make no mention of 
the roles that civilians can play in directly protecting civilians. Randle (2006) suggests one way of 
increasing nonviolent peacekeeping is a continual expansion of the roles and numbers of civilians 
in peacekeeping missions from the small number that exist today.  He shows how nonviolent 
peacekeeping has already made a difference and describes the many roles that civilians can play, 
which are explored below.
Unarmed protection is a nonviolent response to direct violence and it is used in nonviolent 
peacekeeping to protect individuals and communities, for example returning refugees or informal 
groups. It can create the space for them to build and own protection stages, conflict resolution 
mechanisms and a peace community, which will build a sustainable peace.
To achieve a long term sustainable peace requires the collaboration of many agencies, projects 
and stakeholders. This was identified in the CDA project “Reflecting on Peace Practice” and I 
suggest that by using nonviolent peacekeeping strategies, it is possible to increase collaboration, 
reduce the necessity for civil-military cooperation functions, and start the process of building civil 
society and an accountable governance from early on in an intervention.
We must also consider that long term peace can only be secured by the involvement of local 
people and our strategies should be in line with that theory, and also consider that peace cannot be 
imposed through violence so ensuring an intervention models nonviolence will create a stronger 
opportunity for peace.
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Nonviolence
Nonviolence is about transforming or changing the situation, it is about engaging people – 
effective protection strategies that involve local people, and it is participatory – finding out what 
people need and want, and involve communities in discussions on how they want to be protected.
Nonviolence is about change – not just diminishing the violence, but also addressing the 
structural and cultural violence.
As Schweitzer says in the Nonviolent Peaceforce Feasibility (2001):
Nonviolence is always searching for a future for all sides to the conflict, while other 
approaches might be content to have pacified and silenced one side, or in the extreme 
case even aim at their extinction.
Some communities specifically choose nonviolent methods of protection because they fear that 
protection with weapons will draw more fire to them, instead of protecting them from violence.
For example the peace communities in Colombia like San Jose de Apartadó, a community 
who declared themselves a peace community in 199 rejecting any participation in the war and 
not to have any weapons in the community, and not to give information or support any of the 
parties in the conflict. They keep a high national and international profile, aided by international 
accompaniment from unarmed protectors, and have had success in nonviolently resisting the war, 
but since they were formed there have been 160 deaths amongst members of the community, 
and they continue to need a high level of international support and visibility to maintain their 
nonviolent resistance. They are an example of the use of nonviolence through short term protection 
aims and long term peacebuilding through resistance to the war.
If we choose nonviolent peacekeeping, then the links, the trust and relationships necessary for 
peace begin to be built from the first intervention.
Nonviolence can be a tactic used in a specific situation, but is also about challenging violence at 
direct, structural and cultural levels in a society, and is therefore not always welcomed by those with 
an interest in maintaining violence and armed conflict (spoilers).
Strategies
Peacekeeping is being carried out with nonviolent methods and there are various strategies 
that organisations have developed and employ in places such as Colombia, Guatemala, Sri Lanka, 
Philippines and Indonesia.
Nonviolent peacekeeping can equally be carried out by civilians in their own country. Schirch 
(2006) mentions women in Africa interpositioning themselves between warring tribes or of white 
Americans accompanying African Americans to deter violence as segregation was opposed, and 
even when there is an external intervention it will typically include the goal of enabling local people 
to provide their own protection mechanisms, or even include local people on the peacekeeping 
teams, as Nonviolent Peaceforce does in Mindanao, Philippines. 
Nonviolent peacekeeping primarily uses dissuasion, or deterrence, rather than force, to stop 
violence. Nonviolence analyst Gene Sharp defines dissuasion as,
the result of acts or processes which induce an opponent not to carry out a contemplated 
hostile action. Rational argument, moral appeal, increased cooperation, improved 
human understanding, distraction, adoption of non-offensive policy and deterrence 
may all be used to achieve dissuasion. (Sharp 198, cited in Mahony & Eguren 
199:8)
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Schweitzer (2009a:119) notes that deterrence is not the only factor in how nonviolent 
peacekeeping works. She comments that, 
Relationship-building to the local community and trust that is built up to the different 
actors in conflict is at least as important as having ‘international clout’. 
And goes on to list the following as important components to success;
The identity of the peacekeepers (for example gender or country of origin), 
The role they assume in the conflict and whom they represent, 
Local law and tradition (for example special places or respect in some circumstances), and 
A basic interest of all sides in avoiding further violence.
As well as deterring violence and threats, nonviolent peacekeeping seeks to create space for 
people to work effectively on their own safety and peace initiatives. For example, by providing 
constant accompaniment to human rights defenders in Guatemala, Peace Brigades International 
enabled them to travel safely to meet people needing help and support and therefore help build the 
structures for long term peace at the same time as providing protection from direct violence.
Schirch (2006:) identifies some sources of power that civilian peacekeepers can use:
Moral authority – she says, 
civilian peacekeepers can have the power to protect civilians threatened by 
violence, if  they can effectively remind the armed groups of  the basic moral 
values of  the international community and its rights and norms.
Legal authority – the international law system can be supported by civilian peacekeepers 
collecting data that can be used in legal processes.
Media attention – Schirch explains this power as, 
civilian peacekeepers gain credibility and an ability to be effective deterrents 
to violence by advertising their presence and role in newspapers, radio, and 
television. Schirch (2006:45)
Schirch (2006) also describes the following forms of peacekeeping, which apply in different 
situations depending on the nature of the conflict and the violence, and interests of local people:
Buffer Zones – An area, often described in a Peace Agreement, and patrolled by 
peacekeepers to keep opposing parties separate. The monitoring and 
patrolling aspect could be undertaken by nonviolent peacekeepers
Interposition 
Peacekeeping
– Where peacekeepers physically stand between opposing parties, maybe 
enabling communication, or using their ‘moral authority’ to prevent direct 
violence and provide space for nonviolent solutions to be found.
Peace Zones – An area where no fighting takes place and no weapons are carried. These can 
be declared by the inhabitants and do not require peacekeepers, although as 
the peace community in Colombia found, international protective presence 
is necessary if  armed parties to the conflict do not respect the peace zone.
Accompaniment 
and Presence
– Protects individuals, organisations or small groups from attack, which 
reduces direct violence and increases confidence of  those accompanied. It 
can be used to deter known threats or random acts of  violence.
•
•
•
•
40
Christine Schweitzer -  Civilian Peacekeeping
These forms of peacekeeping are dissociative, but peacekeeping also involves other tasks such 
as,
Observing and 
Monitoring
– There are many aspects of  a conflict which can be monitored and recorded, 
such as the conditions of  a peace agreement, the impact on civilians and 
number of  human rights abuses, or conduct of  people during elections. It is 
a role that has been done by unarmed civilians for many years and remains 
important when engaging the international community.
Facilitating 
Communication
– Within peacekeeping facilitating communication can involve preventing 
or stopping rumours that could lead to an escalation in violence, or opening 
communication channels between opposing groups, or providing a safe, 
neutral, space for parties to the conflict to meet.
Some aspects of nonviolent peacekeeping are to ensure that the primary responsibility for 
protecting civilians remains with the state, and that the state is reminded of this. Eguren (2009:10) 
notes that the role of non-governmental actors is to be a permanent reminder to the state that it is 
the state who has the responsibility to protect civilians. Governments still have the responsibility to 
protect civilians, and one role of unarmed protection is to put enough political pressure on them to 
change or generate the political will to protect the civilians.
In order to ensure that civilians receive the protection to which they are entitled, peacekeepers 
would need to ensure they monitor and collect information, have strong links to the authorities, 
and accompany community leaders who request the protection.
Once nonviolent peacekeeping has been identified as a possible strategy there are many decisions 
about approach and methods of implementation. Analysis of the situation, identifying points of 
leverage, and how the international community are being involved will help inform the choice of 
tasks and activities. There is overlap between the strategies and tasks because peacekeeping relies 
on a number of inter-related approaches that then carried out iteratively over time aim to reduce 
violence, but it is not a linear process that can be easily separated and progression mapped out. 
Eguren (2009:10) suggests that once a specific strategy has been adopted, then the essential 
tasks must be chosen, which he suggests could be;
a) To maintain a presence in the area.
For example the Nonviolent Peaceforce teams in Sri Lanka regularly monitor several IDP 
camps, visiting others as field work takes them to other parts of  the district. They respond to 
emergency calls for protective presence when residents feel insecure about some developing 
incident, or the local Human Rights Commission (HRC), depend on the same Sri Lanka Team’s 
presence and accompaniment for their field investigations from time to time, including in 
contested border areas where land disputes can quickly turn violent. 
b) Build and maintain a network of contacts.
For example when hundreds of  families living in Sri Lankan border areas between Muslim and 
Tamil communities that were becoming increasingly violent towards one another fled their 
homes and sought safety in churches or other community centers, a Nonviolent Peaceforce 
team was able to visit several of  these make-shift camps and convey to other agencies the 
immediate needs for relief  the families shared.
The work of  Nonviolent Peaceforce in setting up strong community networks in part prevented 
the same violence spreading northwards and the Valaichchenai Traders Association, made up 
of  Tamil and Muslim businesses, requested Nonviolent Peaceforce to host a meeting where 30 
traders came together to discuss how to prevent violence from spreading in their area.
41
Christine Schweitzer -  Civilian Peacekeeping
c) Ensure regular communication with authorities and officials.
For example in Sri Lanka there are continuous reports of  adults affected by threats, arrests, 
killings, abductions, forced recruitment, disappearances, and sexual/gender-based violence. 
Nonviolent Peaceforce provides support to help people to report their cases to agencies, for 
example the Human Rights Commission, or to access legal advice.
d) Publish analysis and information. 
Peacekeeping organisations do this to different extents. For some it is expected that the 
peacekeepers will return home with their information and experience and share it widely, whilst 
others tightly control what comments are made, but all peacekeepers rely to some extent on 
informing others about the situation in which they work.
Other commonly used activities, which overlap with strategies in some areas, are:
e) Accompaniment. 
For example Peace Brigades International have 25 years of  experience in accompanying 
community leaders to protect them from attack. Or Accompaniment of  individuals could be 
for many different reasons for example a local NGO partner doing community awareness 
programs in a vulnerable area who sought Nonviolent Peaceforce support to travel with them 
to and from the area so they felt safe carrying out their program or a community leader in fear 
of  armed group activity in area where he was meeting.
f ) Monitoring. 
For example the tasks of  presence and monitoring are already carried out by nonviolent 
peacekeepers. The Nonviolent Peaceforce project in Sri Lanka use presence and monitoring to 
reduce the threat and spread of  direct violence in vulnerable communities.
g) Linking people to authorities or agencies.
For example in Sri Lanka, relationships were strengthened with government agencies mandated 
to help protect children, such as the Probation Department and the National Child Protection 
Commission. While Nonviolent Peaceforce facilitated initial meetings with government 
servants, the confidence of  parents increased and they were able to subsequently advocate on 
their own behalf. Such activities help empower local communities to be more active agents for 
the protection of  their children.
h) Training and dialogue at community level.
For example working with a number of  active Peace Committees in Sri Lanka, Nonviolent 
Peaceforce supports community-based efforts aimed at bringing different communities 
together across issues and boundaries, for example meeting Peace Committees to discuss any 
early warning signs of  communal tensions erupting. 
Nonviolent peacekeeping does not happen in vacuum, and relies on the connection of a 
peacekeeper to other people at anytime, so the tools of unarmed peacekeeping are cameras, tape 
recorders, satellite phones, and notebooks. The need to document and communicate is essential 
in successful nonviolent protection (Martin 2009) and ensures that the links to other people are 
clear.
In addition the necessity of having trust in communities needs to be emphasised. Trust by the 
community is first established by being invited in as non-violent peacekeepers by local community 
leaders, and then by living and working with people on a day-to-day business, and following up 
the work they commit to doing. By being able to demonstrate that there is a real benefit that the 
peacekeepers provides, gradually trust will develop.
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Conclusion
Whilst peacekeeping continues to be an essential component in the creation of a durable peace, 
the new strategies and proven impact of the existing projects of nonviolent peacekeeping show that 
it is a viable and useful method that can be used in an intervention.
Peacekeeping continues to be a subject debated and developed, and Michael Randle suggests 
that a continuous increase in the number of nonviolent peacekeepers will help demonstrate and 
enable nonviolent peacekeeping to be used by larger agencies.
If we continue with the assumption that the military are the only ones with power to stop 
violence, then we miss a huge opportunity to empower and engage those who require protection.
Although the military peacekeepers in an intervention do good and can improve a situation, 
there may be better ways of doing it using nonviolent strategies. The two are not direct alternatives, 
but when nonviolent peacekeeping can be used, it can reduce some of the negative aspects of 
military peacekeeping and contribute to improve collaboration.
The existing projects have demonstrated that in taking on the unarmed protection and 
peacekeeping role, civilians can:
1. Protect people from immediate harm (for example prevention through rumour control, presence 
and accompaniment to reduce likelihood of  attack, and coordination to ensure international 
pressure), 
2. Contribute to medium term goals where there is an absence of  direct violence (for example 
training local people in unarmed protection methods, building peace committees) and,
3. Support long term efforts for a safe and secure community (model nonviolent alternatives, 
support the creation of  structures to handle human rights abuses).
The benefits of this are that short, medium and long term goals can be integrated as required 
in a community without the need to falsely separate the actions, or leave civil society initiatives 
unsupported (as they could be in a military intervention because military methods rarely don’t 
allow for ownership of a protection strategy to be shared with civil society).
If peacekeeping had nonviolent protection strategies recognized as proven and used in the 
formation of peacekeeping missions, it could influence how we implement and coordinate long 
term peace strategies.
Synergy between short and long term goals is important in finding sustainable peace. If we 
want them to be integrated (making long term goals easier to achieve), want local ownership and 
embedded protection strategies, then we need to allow nonviolence to guide our actions from 
peacekeeping to peacebuilding.
We need more peacekeepers, but let us open the possibility that nonviolent peacekeepers can 
take a greater role and their activities can benefit those who live in fear of direct violence.
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Humanitarian Protection as an Additional Function of Humanitarian, 
Development and Peace Projects—Or Rather a Task Requiring Experts? 
By Christine Schweitzer
Introduction
The importance of protection of civilians—a phrase used here to mean assuring the safety of 
civilians from acute harm (O’Callaghan & Pantuliano 200:3)41—has been amply recognized in the 
international field. I focus in this contribution on harm resulting from armed conflict or protracted 
violent social conflict—in other words, protection against threats of direct violence committed by 
a human perpetrator. 
In mainstream politics, increased threats to security in crisis regions are often solely seen vis-à-
vis the decision to send in armed forces. The debate on human security and on the Responsibility 
to Protect (R2P) illustrates this observation. Said debate is in fact dominated by the issue, despite 
the UN General Assembly’s clear message that R2P is not only about military intervention.42 In this 
paper I would like to leave out the question of military peacekeeping or ‘humanitarian intervention’ 
and concentrate solely on civilian, unarmed strategies and methods of protection.
Several overlapping discourses can be distinguished:
1. Discussion on the concepts of  Human Security and the Responsibility to Protect.43 
2. Discussion of  strategies and methods of  humanitarian protection, usually referring to 
humanitarian protection as a task ‘to mainstream’ by humanitarian organisations. 44 Protection 
here is understood consisting of  three layers: The first is ‘responsive action,’ which ‘is defined 
as any activity undertaken in the context of  an emerging or established pattern of  abuses, 
aimed at preventing its recurrence, putting a stop to it and/or alleviating its immediate effects.’ 
Methods are pressuring authorities or convincing them, providing direct services to persons 
exposed to abuse, alleviating immediate suffering, legal assistance (see the UN Inter-Agency 
Standing Committee publication on ‘Growing the Sheltering Tree’ 2002:16pp). The other 
two forms of  humanitarian protection are remedial action, which ‘refers to action taken with 
a view to restoring dignified living conditions subsequent to a pattern of  abuse’ (2002:16) 
41 Slim & Bonwick (2005:52pp) define protection as reduction of  vulnerability, using the risk-based model: Risk = 
Threat + Vulnerability x Time. 
42 The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) put forward by a report of  the International Commission on Intervention 
and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2001. It was then adopted by the 2005 United Nations World Summit of  Heads of  
States and Governments and confirmed a year later by the UN Security Council. The World Summit affirmed that 
‚each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from four types of  crimes: genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity‘ (see Evans 2008). According to this concept, if  a State fails to meet its 
responsibility, the international community has the responsibility to intervene, by force if  necessary. The Responsibility 
to Protect furthermore recognizes three elements or phases: a responsibility to prevent, a responsibility to react, and a 
responsibility to rebuild, and describes three pillars. Pillar 1 is the responsibility of  each State to protect its population 
from the R2P crimes and their incitement. Pillar 2 consists of  international assistance and capacity building to help 
States to meet these obligations. Pillar 3 is the timely and decisive response, including intervention in the sense of  
acting against the will of  the State in question. 
43 On R2P, two publications summarizing the debate held so far are Evans 2008 and Von Arnauld 2009. See also 
United Nations Secretary-General 2009. The discussion of  Human Security that to some extent preceded that on 
R2P was started by a UNDP report from 1994 (United Nations Development Programme 1994). While some of  its 
protagonists prefer to widen the concept to cover all sorts of  threats, others (e.g. the Human Security Centre) focus 
on threats caused by armed conflict. See the webpage of  the Centre <www.humansecuritycentre.org> and A Human 
Security Doctrine for Europe (2004).
44 See for example, International Committee of  the Red Cross 1999, United Nations Inter-Agency Standing Committee 
2002, Slim & Eguren 2004, Slim & Bonwick 2005, O’Callaghan & Pantuliano 2007, International Committee of  the 
Red Cross 2008. 
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and environment-building action which ‘involves contributing to creating a social, cultural, 
institutional, and legal environment conducive to respect for the rights of  the individual, in 
accordance with the letter and the sprit of  the relevant bodies of  law’ (2002:19). 
3. The role and work of  UNHCR, ICRC (see for example International Committee of  the Red 
Cross 2008).
4. Civilian Peacekeeping, a term used here to mean the prevention of  direct violence through 
influence or control of  the behaviour of  potential perpetrators by unarmed civilians who are 
deployed on the ground. The literature here consists mostly of  case studies and overviews 
from different projects, missions and organisations.45 Sometimes, in particular in the USA, the 
term ‘nonviolent intervention’ is used to describe the same field. The NGO world is heavily 
dominated by projects referring to themselves as peace teams. As to unarmed governmental 
missions, these are often civilian ceasefire, human rights or election monitoring missions. 
5. Particular topics related to the field are humanitarian negotiation, the safety of  humanitarian 
personnel, and the discussion on Do No Harm.46
6. Besides these discourses focusing on the role of  external parties in protection, there is also 
growing evidence about the role of  local civil society in protection.47 
Starting from the basic strategy of ‘proactive’ or ‘conscious’ presence as a model of how to 
protect civilians48, the main methods used in protection are 
Protective accompaniment aiming at deterring an attack, a method developed and linked 
mostly to the NGO Peace Brigades International, though a number of other peace team 
projects also use accompaniment as a major tactic49; 
Monitoring of the situation of vulnerable groups and/or of human rights in general;
Visibility through local or regional offices and/or patrolling;
Sustained multi-level diplomacy50;
Active encouragement and empowerment of civil society;
Bridging and convening mechanisms bringing parties together; and 
Public advocacy. 
Sometimes also the tactic of interpositioning, ‘peacekeepers placing themselves physically 
between groups engaged in violent conflict,’ (Schirch 199:2) is added here.51
45 See Schirch 1995, Moser-Puangsuwan & Weber (eds) 2000, Schweitzer et al 2001, Mahony 2006, Schirch 2006:8, 
Clark (ed) 2009. An exception are Mahony & Eguren 1997 who developed a theory of  unarmed deterrence to explain 
the strategy and impact of  protective accompaniment.
46 Humanitarian negotiation: See Mancini-Roth & Picot 2004, McHugh & Bessler 2006. 
Safety of  humanitarian personnel: See Stoddard et al 2006.
Do no harm: See Anderson 1999.
47 See O’Callaghan & Pantuliano (2007:4pp) who distinguish 1. Avoidance through flight, 2. Engaging with armed 
groups and negotiating or purchasing safety, or 3. Active resistance, and the comparative study of  the Centre on 
Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding Geneva (Paffenholz 2009a and 2009b).
48 Mahony 2006:v, Inter-Agency Standing Committee 2002:42pp.
49 The ‚physical presence of  foreign volunteers with the dual purpose of  protecting civilian activists or organizations from violent, politically 
motivated attacks and encouraging them to proceed with their democratic activities.’ (Mahony & Eguren 1997:2)
50 This and the following see Stoddard et al 2006. They refer to the work of  humanitarian agencies but their list is 
equally valid for civilian peacekeeping missions.
51 See articles in Moser-Puangsuwan & Weber (eds) 2000 and Schweitzer et al 2001 for a critical discussion of  
interpositioning.
•
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The first of two major mechanisms at work in unarmed protection is deterrence of a perpetrator, 
a strategy researched and defined on the example of the work of Peace Brigades International by 
Mahony & Eguren (199). 
International accompaniment can succeed in deterring attacks because the decision 
makers behind these attacks seldom want a bad international image. They don’t want 
the world to know about what they are doing. They don’t want diplomats making 
them uncomfortable mentioning human rights problems in their meetings. They 
don’t want to read in the international press that they are being called monsters or 
criminals. (Mahony 200:)
The second is acceptance, entailing 
the … agency becoming a familiar and trusted entity by the host community and 
the beneficiary population, cultivating a network of contacts and intermediaries to 
maintain open lines of communication and reception from the key (often belligerent) 
parties. (Stoddard et al 2006:1)
This paper aims in particular to discuss whether protection is most effectively and efficiently 
provided as an additional function of the work of aid and development organisations on the ground 
(‘mainstreaming’ of protection), or if in situations of extensive tension it is preferable or more 
effective to have organisations concentrating solely on civilian peacekeeping. To simplify language, 
the term ‘humanitarian protection’ shall be used to describe protection as a function fulfilled by 
humanitarian organisations, and ‘civilian peacekeeping’ to describe projects or missions deploying 
personnel with the provision of protection as a major objective.
The paper is based mainly on my recent not yet published dissertation on interventions by 
non-state actors into the conflicts in former Yugoslavia (Schweitzer 2009b), on the findings of 
the comparative Nonviolent Peaceforce Feasibility Study (Schweitzer et al 2001) and on my direct 
experience between 2001 and 2008 as Programme Director of the INGO Nonviolent Peaceforce 
that has or has had projects in Sri Lanka, Guatemala and the Philippines. As case studies, I will 
present the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s and the civilian peacekeeping work in Mindanao, 
Philippines. 
Case Study 1: Protection in the former Yugoslavia
There has been a broad plethora of missions, organisations and projects involved in humanitarian 
protection and peacekeeping in the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia (Croatia, Bosnia, Kosovo) 
in the 1990s. There has been little that was not tried over the years, by international organisations 
and individual governments, by nongovernmental organisations, churches, an uncounted number 
of small citizens’ groups in Western Europe and North America, by civil society groups from the 
former Yugoslavia itself, and others. As to protection, there have been many state and non-state 
actors combining the function of protection with other strategies as well as (governmental) civilian 
missions with peacekeeping as a main focus.52
52 I am referring here solely to direct protection what in the literature on humanitarian protection is often called 
„responsive action‘, see footnote above.
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Governmental Missions
Aside from the different military peacekeeping missions,53 there have been several larger-
scale governmental civilian peacekeeping missions, as well as UN agencies with a clear protection 
mandate.54 
The first was the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM, later EUMM, from 
1991-200).55 In July 1991, the ECMM was sent to Slovenia and Croatia with a typical peacekeeping 
mandate of monitoring ceasefires but also including protection elements like monitoring the release 
and return of prisoners in cooperation with ICRC (Maloney 199:28pp).
With the deployment of UNPROFOR in 1992, the mandate of ECMM changed. It concentrated 
then on those thematic and geographic areas which did not fall under the UNPROFOR mandate, 
gathering information on ceasefire violations, military movements, the local civil situation and the 
status of implementation of the Vance Peace Plan of 1991 (the plan that had led to the deployment 
of UNPROFOR I). They also accompanied international negotiator teams, brokered local ceasefires, 
helped with the exchange of prisoners of war, escorted (without arms) humanitarian aid, reported 
on human rights violations, etc.56 
In Croatia, the ECMM ran into many problems. It faced logistical dilemmas and suffered from 
poor communication and confusion over objectives and priorities. The Serbs saw the monitors as 
spies for Croatia, while in Croatia they were considered highly ineffective and usually referred to by 
the nickname ‘ice cream men’ because of their white uniforms (see Maloney 199, Ramsbotham 
and Woodhouse 1999:88pp, Lucarelli 2000:26pp). Nevertheless, they may have achieved more on 
the ground than they were credited with at the time, preventing small incidents from leading to 
major confrontations (see Gow 199:106, Libal 199:9, Giersch 1998:98).
The second has been the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) of the OSCE. Under the threat of 
NATO intervention in Kosovo in the autumn of 1998, the Yugoslav government under Milosevic 
agreed at the end of October 1998 to the deployment of a civilian peacekeeping force.57 An unarmed 
OSCE mission was acceptable to both sides, although the Kosovo-Albanian leadership would have 
preferred an armed peacekeeping force. Deployment began in November 1998, but not having the 
personnel (or equipment) ready, the Mission only reached around  percent of the agreed number 
of 2,000 staff before it was withdrawn on March 20, 1999 after the collapse of the Rambouillet 
negotiations.
Its mandate was to establish a permanent presence throughout Kosovo, monitor the ceasefire 
agreed between OSCE and FR Yugoslavia in October 1998 and to report ceasefire violations, 
conduct border monitoring, and facilitate the return of refugees along with ICRC and UNHCR. It 
was also anticipated that it would supervise elections in Kosovo. The Verifiers established permanent 
53 UNPROFOR I – III 1992-95, UNPREDEP in Macedonia (before UNPROFOR III, until 1999), IFOR/SFOR in 
Bosnia-Hercegovina from end of  1995 until 2004, then becoming EUFOR, KFOR in Kosovo from 1999 onward 
being the main ones.
54 Though their civilian character however was limited since they operated in heavily militarised scenarios. The Kosovo 
Verification Mission was even protected by a NATO Extraction Force (see above). 
55 They were mainly recruited from civil servants (diplomats) and the military (professional soldiers). Besides the (then 
12 ) EC countries also Canada, Sweden and some Eastern European countries participated. The head of  the mission 
automatically came from the country which had the EC (EU) presidency, and changed every six months (as did most 
of  the monitors, few of  whom had contracts for longer than six months.) The EUMM in the Western Balkans came to 
an end formally on 31 December 2007, during its final years only maintaining a presence in Montenegro and Albania. 
For ECMM / EUMM in general, see Giersch 1998:96pp and 129pp. (In forthcoming Schweitzer 2010, a fuller list of  
references is given.)
56 They also became involved in small-scale humanitarian aid, for example delivering letters across border-lines, locating 
missing people etc. 
57 For an overview on the KVM, see Loquai 1999, Wenig 1999, Schweitzer et al. 2001 and Dufour 2007. In Schweitzer 
2009b), a fuller list of  references is given.
47
Christine Schweitzer -  Civilian Peacekeeping
outposts in crisis areas, visited places where fighting was reported, monitored several court trials, 
conducted weapons verification inspections, accompanied Serbian police and Serbian investigators 
to places controlled by the UCK, and sought to intervene actively if they came across violence.
The evaluation of KVM is rather contested. On the one hand, it undoubtedly managed to 
reduce violence by talking to both sides and convincing them to contain localised outbreaks of 
violence. 58 In addition, their mere presence played a role in restraining violence. Specifically, at 
the beginning of the mission, the ceasefire was respected. Both the Serbs and the more moderate 
commanders of the UCK were willing to stop fighting, which gave a chance for stabilisation of 
the situation. Refugees and displaced persons returned in greater numbers as the fighting calmed 
down. Even in January-February 1999 when the situation became tense again, the arrival of KVM 
personnel on the scene usually had a de-escalating effect.59
On the other hand, the Verifiers could not fully contain the violence. There were attacks on 
police and civilians all the time in varying degrees, and increasingly also on the Verifiers themselves.60 
The agreement to deploy KVM was also flawed because it was an agreement between the USA and 
FR Yugoslavia, with the UCK not being a party to it, and not feeling bound by it (see Calic 1998). 
As Judah (2002:198) and Loquai (2000:62) point out, the ceasefire was also used by the UCK to 
move back into its strongholds as soon as the Yugoslavs withdrew, probably in preparation for a new 
offensive in spring 1999. 
My evaluation would be that given the circumstances under which KVM was deployed—
with one party of the conflict explicitly hoping to bring about the military intervention already 
threatened against the other party—the KVM was surprisingly successful in the field. 
There were several other governmental missions and organisations with peacekeeping roles and 
functions, among them:
1. International police (IPTF/ CIVPOL and EUPM) were deployed by the UN or the EU at 
one point or the other in almost all countries of  former Yugoslavia. They have usually had a 
mandate that focused on training of  local police (which would fall under peace-building), but 
many of  them also had a monitoring element to their mandate, including dealing with incidents 
of  political violence and how ethnic minorities were treated by the local police forces. The IPT 
in Kosovo from 1999 onward has been one of  the first international police missions with an 
executive mandate, meaning that they have the right to arrest people themselves rather than 
only accompanying local forces.61 
2. Being the UN’s lead agency to deal with the humanitarian crises in former Yugoslavia, UNHCR 
also had a clearly protection-related mandate, e.g. through its presence at vulnerable places. 
There were also cases when UNHCR helped threatened groups to leave the area or the country, 
although this was mostly the initiative of  the staff  on the ground and not part of  their mandate. 
To avoid the accusation of  helping with ethnic cleansing, UNHCR was not supposed to help 
people escape.62 
Protection and Peacekeeping by Civil Society Actors
Unlike the situation in some other countries, peacekeeping by civil society actors was relatively 
rare. Preventing and stopping violence by deploying personnel on the ground and addressing the 
58 ‚The first weeks of  deployment had shown that in those areas where verifiers were present, the number of  incidents 
decreased.‘ (Wenig 1999:83p, translation CS)
59 See Loquai 2000:61pp , Wenig 1999/2000:89. 
60 See the Kosovo Updates of  KVM from 27.1.99, 22.2.99, 23.2.99, 26.2.99.
61 For the International Police missions, see Holm & Eide (eds) 2000. (In Schweitzer 2009b, a fuller list of  references 
is given.)
62 See Woodward 1995:243, 319 and 325. 
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potential perpetrators has mostly been just one function among several of the different projects and 
organisations in question. 
There is only one example of an organisation that had a longer-term peacekeeping mandate:63 
The volunteer project Balkan Peace Team (BPT) that was working with small teams of 2- people 
each in Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia between 199 and 2001. BPT’s overall 
goal was a wide one: to ‘promote a peaceful development by maintaining a permanent presence 
of international volunteers in some crisis areas’ (Schweitzer and Clark 2002:29). Protection and 
support of dialogue were its two foci. In Serbia and Kosovo, the priority was the support of dialogue 
between civil society activists, whilst in Croatia, protection was more important and revolved mainly 
about two issues. 
The first was the issue of illegal house evictions, which was a focus of concern for a number 
of local human rights groups. In the first years after independence, the Croatian state (or local 
authorities) tried to evict tenants from flats that had belonged to the Yugoslav Peoples’ Army. 
Victims were usually ethnic Serbs. Accompanying local human rights activists to evictions was 
one of the first protection-related activities BPT undertook in 199 (see Mueller 2006:8). When 
called to an eviction, BPT volunteers usually did not only come by themselves but also called upon 
other international agencies and media to be present as well. In several cases, the police aborted 
their attempts to evict the tenant when they found that internationals were present in the flat.
The second was monitoring the situation in the former Krajina (UN Protected Areas West and 
South) after the reoccupation by Croatia in 199, and again the accompaniment of local activists 
to the area. In Western Slavonia, BPT together with volunteers from other international projects 
entered the area within a few days of the reconquest, seeking to establish a continuous presence of 
observers. One volunteer spent two nights in the house of a local politician who was considered to 
be threatened (see Mueller 2006:63).64 
While the theoretical reflection of the importance of humanitarian protection may have still been 
mostly lacking in the earlier 1990s, in practice many organisations found themselves challenged 
with issues of direct protection in certain situations: 
Just to give one example: In the early years after the end of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
peace-building projects working there found themselves sometimes challenged by the possibility 
of interethnic violence especially in the context of refugee and IDP return. While they usually 
tended to call to IFOR/SFOR in for such cases—for example to escort people visiting graveyards—
there were also situations where the presence of the civilian peace or development workers directly 
provided some protection. For example, one peace worker from the German Civil Peace Service 
in Banja Luka looked after an elderly widow who had returned to her pre-war apartment but was 
afraid of being attacked and evicted again (see Pax Christi 2003).
Besides these activities of direct protection, thousands of NGOs have been involved in supporting 
IDPs and refugees or other war victims and fulfilling functions of humanitarian protection. One 
example which is a bit out of the ordinary is what civil society organisations in several European 
countries started to do, namely helping refugees to leave the war area and come to third European 
countries against the will of the government of these countries that were not willing to accept more 
refugees as agreed in form of ‚contingents’ each EU country was to accept. In Germany between 
1993/9 and the end of 199, the initiative ‘Survive the War’ brought more than 8,000 people out 
of Bosnia and Croatia.65 
63 There were several short-term peace caravans and similar activist-type projects with an element of  interpositioning 
into the war in Bosnia and the conflict in Kosovo but they had little if  any positive impact. See Schweitzer 2009b.
64 Both in Mueller (2006) and Schweitzer & Clark (2002), a number of  further examples of  accompaniment of  local 
activist in this context can be found.
65 It used a gap in the German immigration laws. People from non-EU countries could get a three-month visa if  they 
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Case Study 2: Civilian Peacekeeping ‘Pure’: Nonviolent Peaceforce in the 
Philippines (Mindanao)
In the first case study on the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, there has been no example of a 
longer-term, stable NGO focusing on civilian peacekeeping. Therefore I would like to introduce 
this second example which is perhaps particularly attractive because it involves the cooperation of 
local and international civilian peacekeepers.66
The ceasefire agreed between the government of the Philippines and the insurgent Muslim Moro 
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in Mindanao in 200 was monitored by an official mechanism 
that had four elements: The Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities(CCCH), 
Local Monitoring Teams, an International Monitoring Team staffed mostly by Malaysia, and an 
Ad hoc Joint Action Group. The CCCH set up Monitoring Posts in the conflict areas that were 
manned by government and MILF soldiers as well as with representatives of local civil society 
initiatives. The extraordinary feature of this set-up was the close involvement of several hundred 
local civil society peacekeepers who mostly work in a voluntary capacity.67
These local peace groups invited Nonviolent Peaceforce (NP) to send an international team to 
provide support and protective presence to local groups working to enhance civil society initiatives 
and prevent violence. NP is a young international NGO based in Brussels, founded with the goal 
to develop unarmed peacekeeping, in the sense of having direct impact for the human security of 
populations caught in an armed conflict through the presence of large numbers of international 
trained professionals using purely nonviolent means.68 
Beneficiaries of the project were be vulnerable communities, individuals and civil society groups 
whose lives and work are threatened by the continuing violence or threat of violence, in particular 
women and children. 
Nonviolent Peaceforce sent its first team of six persons to Mindanao in May 200. In the first 
two years of its work, NP has been able together with local groups to work successfully on several 
smaller and larger incidents in Central Mindanao as well as the Sulu Archipel including Basilan), 
helping to prevent such incidents leading to a full-scale military confrontation. The tasks of NP 
teams include:
To reduce the incidence of violence in the vicinity of NP field sites (which are based in conflict-
prone areas) through quickly responding when violent clashes threaten or break out, keeping 
lines of communication open with all parties, helping to negotiate ceasefires that would allow 
civilians to leave the area, and accompanying local monitors and negotiators. 
To support human rights reporting mechanisms in remote conflict areas and to assist/connect 
local and international advocacy groups 
To localise grassroots conflicts so that they are resolved through dialogue at the lowest level and 
do not escalate into larger crises 
To help set up a system of early warning and early response by local civil society.
Training and other support to local civil society groups
were invited personally by a resident who guaranteed the costs of  their stay.. Through the network of  its supporters 
and through public appeals, Survive the War found hundreds of  individuals, families and local groups, both ethnic 
Germans and people with a migration background from the area to personally invite refugees. See Schweitzer 2009b.
66 There are many other examples of  such NGOs to be found in the literature, e.g. Peace Brigades International, 
Witness for Peace, Carea and different initiatives in Palestine. See Moser-Puangsuwan & Weber 2000, Schweitzer et al 
2001, Schirch 2006.
67 See Bantay Ceasefire 2003. The ceasefire broke down when the peace talks collapsed in 2008 which meant the 
suspension of  the ceasefire mechanisms and led Malaysia to leave the IMT, and also Currently (September 2009) there 
are indicators that the peace process will be revived and new ceasefire monitoring mechanisms created. 
68 See http://www.nonviolentpeaceforce.org.
•
•
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Protective accompaniment of local groups (e.g. when a Philippine-wide peace caravan was 
undertaken in 2008)
Linking civil society and governmental actors from all sides and different levels of society
Engage the leaders of different parties involve in the peace process and other stakeholders, and 
maintain impartial and open lines of communications with armed parties to the conflict
The overall internal monitoring of the project (a first external evaluation will only take place 
later in 2009) shows that the presence of the International Civilian Peacekeepers (as the NP field 
personnel are called) is quite effective in spite of the situation that worsened in 2008 with the 
suspension of the ceasefire mechanism and the resumption of fights which only recently in August 
2009 have been ended once more. NP is contributing impressively in this critical situation to deter 
and document cases of human rights violations, creating spaces for dialogue at various levels. The 
continuous presence of NP International Civilian Peacekeepers on the ground also helps to relay 
real-time information to all the key stakeholders in the peace process. 
After two years of presence, most stakeholders in Mindanao have come to know NP and to 
understand and appreciate its role. This, however, has not been easy to achieve. In the process of 
setting up the work, a number of obstacles had to be overcome, often due to the problem local NGOs 
had in understanding what an NGO that was not going to distribute relief or engage in physical 
construction, etc. was about. Unlike the human rights defenders in many Latin American countries 
who by now are well familiar with the role of NGOs providing humanitarian accompaniment 
and know how to make use of this service, international NGOs in Mindanao were traditionally 
considered to be either relief/development organisations or missionaries.69 
Similarly, though NP has experienced a real breakthrough in this regard in the last year when 
the peace process came under a real threat, it has also not been easy to convince funders that such 
work is worth funding.
Another issue is how protection works in this case, which is also different from the experience of 
PBI and others in Latin America who more or less solely rely on their international clout for their 
security.70 In NP’s analysis, there is a double mechanism of protection at work here as regards the 
work of international civilian peacekeepers: They are providing the ‘eye and ear of the world,’ and 
being outsiders are able to talk to all sides of the conflict without being seen as partisan. Their own 
security is based on the trust the local communities and the civil society partners of NP give the 
international peacekeepers. The result is a relationship of mutual support and protection, with its 
outcome being an increase of the impact the joint peacekeeping efforts have.
Conclusion
The question asked at the beginning of this paper was whether protection is most effectively 
and efficiently provided as an additional function of the work of aid and development organisations 
on the ground (‘mainstreaming’ of protection), or if in situations of extensive tension it is better 
or more effective to have organisations concentrating solely on civilian peacekeeping. Based on 
the examples from Southeast Europe and the Philippines, it is possible to list both strengths and 
weaknesses for each approach.71 
69 Personal experience of  the author in Guatemala and the Philippines while supporting NP’s work in these countries.
70 See Mahony & Eguren 1997.
71 See also Slim & Bonwick 2005:46pp, Mahony 2006:51, O’Callaghan & Pantuliano 2007:17, International Committee 
of  the Red Cross 2008. 
•
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Table 7) Comparison Civilian PK - humanitarian protection
Strengths, advantages Weaknesses, disadvantages
Humanitarian 
Protection
Trust and acceptance already 
formed through humanitarian work
Economic and political weight 
because of the humanitarian 
commitment
Capacity: Infrastructure already in 
place
Long-standing contacts in the area
Funding may be easier because 
there is much more money available 
for relief and development as there 
is for protection and peacekeeping
Can be applied in situations where 
threats are only occasional
•
•
•
•
•
•
Capability of staff (lack of training 
and special conflict-transformation 
related knowledge)
Capacity: personnel and financial 
resources may be insufficient for 
what is considered an additional 
task
Possible conflict with conflict 
parties over issues of protection 
which may lead to loss of 
acceptance or in worst case having 
to leave the country
May disguise the need ‚to do more‘ 
from the side of the international 
community
May not fit well into mandate
Politicization of humanitarian 
action in eyes of stakeholders
Intra-organizational problems: 
internal hurdles and resistance 
surrounding words like ‚advocacy‘
Risk to personnel may increase
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Civilian 
Peacekeeping
Capability (special training)
Capacity: Personnel and financial 
resources are dedicated to the 
purpose
Failure or problems with conflict 
parties would not necessarily affect 
service provision by humanitarian 
agencies
Mandate can be written to exactly 
fit the situation
May be mandated by UN or 
regional governmental organisation 
IN COMPARISON WITH JOB 
SHARE HUMANITARIAN 
AGENCIES -MILITARY PK:
May be more acceptable than 
deployment of international 
military forces
Cheaper
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Trust and acceptance need to be 
gained which may be difficult 
process
Capacity (personnel and financial 
resources need extra recruitment 
and fundraising
There are few special budget 
lines for civilian peacekeeping or 
protection work with international 
donors though the situation is 
much improving recently
Shorter-term stays in the field (this 
goes especially for governmental 
missions that often have a 6 month 
terms instead of 2-3 years as NGOs 
often have).
No economic or political weight 
gained through material aid
Local partners often find it difficult 
to understand that a NGO refuses 
to engage in relief or development 
work
•
•
•
•
•
•
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It also may have fewer undesired 
side-affects like having a population 
already traumatized by many years 
of war and fearing everyone who is 
armed being faced with new heavily 
armed soldiers.
• Some NGOs are carrying an 
ideological burden of religious 
fundamentalism or principled 
nonviolence which deflects from 
the question of impact (see the 
short-term interpositioning projects 
in Bosnia)
Deployment of a peacekeeping 
mission expresses concern about 
situation which may in some 
circumstances increase the 
vulnerability 
•
•
Both 
approaches 
share
Risk to lose perception of non-
partisanship (see EUMM)
Need to talk to all sides which may 
lead to legitimization of certain 
actors
Risk to personnel
Dependency on acceptance by 
actors in conflict, from high level to 
local level
•
•
•
•
This overview is certainly incomplete and more arguments can be added. However, one thing 
becomes quite clear: There is justification for both approaches, but also situations in which the 
concentration of a solely peacekeeping role is advantageous, as the examples of the governmental 
missions in the former Yugoslavia and of the different civil society monitoring organisations in 
Mindanao, Philippines show.
Civilian peacekeeping is an efficient instrument, especially in situations when a ceasefire ended 
the open warfare in a country but violence is still occurring. It cannot enforce peace, of course – but 
then again: how good and convincing is the record of military peacekeeping in doing so? 
Civil peacekeeping is being used under at least two different scenarios: On invitation by civil 
society groups who use nonviolent means of dealing with conflict, or as an outcome of official 
negotiations when one or both sides reject military force for whatever reason.
The costs of civilian peacekeeping are probably much lower than that of military peacekeeping 
because it requires less infrastructure and less hardware. If carried out professionally, it also may 
have fewer undesired side-effects, like having a population already traumatized by many years of 
war being faced with new heavily-armed soldiers.
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The Responsibility to Protect: Towards an Expanded Role for Global Civil 
Society 
By Christine Schweitzer
Introduction 
The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is a doctrine adopted by the 200 United Nations World 
Summit of Heads of States and Governments and confirmed a year later by the UN Security 
Council. The World Summit affirmed that ‘each individual State has the responsibility to protect 
its populations from four types of crimes: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity.’ According to this concept, if a State fails to meet its responsibility, the international 
community has the responsibility to intervene, by force if necessary. The Responsibility to Protect 
furthermore recognizes three elements or phases: a responsibility to prevent, a responsibility to 
react, and a responsibility to rebuild. The document further describes three pillars.72 Pillar 1 is the 
responsibility of each State to protect its population from the R2P crimes and their incitement. Pillar 
2 consists of international assistance and capacity building to help States to meet these obligations. 
Pillar 3 is the timely and decisive response, including intervention in the sense of acting against the 
will of the State in question.73 
The concept of R2P was coined in 2001 by the International Commission of Intervention and 
State Sovereignty (ICISS), an independent commission appointed by the Canadian government in 
response to a speech to the UN General Assembly by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 1999. 
Referring to Kosovo, the Secretary-General spoke of a core challenge ‘to the Security Council and to 
the United Nation as a whole in the next century: to forge unity behind the principle that massive 
and systematic violations of human rights—wherever they may take place—should not be allowed 
to stand.’74 
R2P entered the UN reform process through the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and 
Change that referred to the concept in its 200 report, and was then taken up at the World Summit 
of 200. In early 2009, the Secretary-General has reported on the implementation of R2P to the 
General Assembly, and it is expected that there will be further discussion about the concept this 
year.6
The definition of the three pillars (which cannot be found in the original ICISS report) and in 
particular the emphases of the first two result in large part from the concerns raised by a number of 
States against the concept. Russia, the USA, and China especially wished to uphold the principle of 
absolute sovereignty. In spite of the 200 UN summit decision, some countries in the global South 
72 The three pillars must not be misunderstood as stages in conflict escalation. Rather, as the UN Secretary-General 
(2009) points out, there is no set sequence of  moving from one to another.
73 Pillar 3 is often falsely identified with military intervention alone but includes as well other forms of  non-military 
intervention, in particular sanctions, criminal prosecution of  war crimes and preventing incitement to violence (e.g. 
jamming of  radio frequencies). Here the focus may have shifted since the original ICISS report of  2001. That report 
focuses ((while calling it a last resort) a lot on military ‚humanitarian‘ intervention, trying to define its legitimacy by 
applying the rules of  ‚Just war‘.
74 United Nations Secretary-General 1999, quoted after von Arnauld 2009:17.
75 R2P is not a legal norm though sometimes it has been called an ‚emerging legal norm‘ in spite of  its recognition in 
official UN documents. Only the founding document of  the African Union proclaims in Article 4 that ‚the right of  
the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of  the Assembly in respect to grave circumstances, 
namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity‘ (quoted after von Arnauld 2009:24). 
76 See von Arnauld 2009 for a discussion of  the different elements of  the concept and how their emphasis changed 
between the ICISS report and the report of  the Secretary-General in 2009.
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continue to suspect R2P as a new legitimization for military aggression by the global North against 
their countries and just another way to bring about regime change.77
In his January 2009 report, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon invited the UN General 
Assembly to ‘address ways to define and develop the partnerships between States and the international 
community under Pillar 2’ (2009:30), and in particular invited ‘further creative thinking’ about 
the option of creating a standing or standby rapid response civilian and police capacity for such 
emergencies: ‘There have been a host of proposals by Governments and civil society alike for creating 
a standing or standby rapid-response civilian and police capacity for such emergencies. I would 
encourage further creative thinking about such an option and will ensure its careful review by the 
relevant United Nations officials.’ (2009:18)
This article will take a closer look at the role of national and international civil society in R2P, 
arguing that civil society has a much more ample role to play providing protection against mass 
atrocities than has hitherto been recognized, and that a civil society approach may also help to defuse 
the concern that R2P is merely a euphemism for military intervention intended to camouflage 
Northern hegemonial interests.
The Role of Civil Society as Defined So Far Under R2P
In the documents on R2P, generally only a few paragraphs or pages are devoted to the role 
of civil society. In the original ICISS study, civil society is discussed primarily in the context of 
monitoring of and advocating for human rights norms and early warning, as well as provision 
of humanitarian aid in times of war (2001:1, 20, 61, 1pp). In his 2009 report, the Secretary-
General mentions the cooperation of civil society in the efforts under Pillar 2 (p.9), noting that 
states can seek technical cooperation (p.13). Under Pillar 3 he only recognizes an advocacy role for 
international civil society, observing that its reactions often shape the international response to a 
crisis, as in the case of Darfur (p.26). 
In his recently published book, ICISS co-chair Gareth Evans defines four distinct roles for civil 
society (2008:198pp): 
as think tanks, research institutions or policy forums;
as campaign and advocacy organisations; 
as on-the-ground operational organisations promoting peace through mediation, capacity and 
building, and the like; and 
as humanitarian relief organisations.
He states that all these roles are relevant in various ways to R2P tasks and are present in all three 
stages of prevention, reaction and rebuilding. They are in his eyes not a substitute for governments 
but complementary to them, filling gaps that official organisations and institutions cannot or will 
not fill.
In 2008, some international NGOs created the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 
which seeks through research and advocacy to ‘advance and consolidate the World Summit consensus 
on R2P, protect its integrity, clarify the cases of use or non-use of military force, build capacity 
77 See von Arnauld 2009, Evans 2008. This became also very clear when France in 2008 suggested that the situation in 
Myanmar caused by the cyclone Nargis should be consider a R2P case. It led to angry debates in the UN (ECOSOC in 
particular) and many states felt that this ‚was a confirmation of  their assessment that R2P is another way of  bringing about regime 
change under the cover of  humanitarian action‘ (KOFF 2009:5-6). 
•
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on R2P within international organisations and governments, and have in place mechanisms and 
strategies necessary to generate an effective political response.’8
What is strikingly missing from the discussion is a more direct role for civil society in protection 
other than early warning, advocacy and what generally would be considered to fall under peacebuilding 
(like dialogue, capacity building, etc). Neither have these publications yet suggested that local and 
global civil society has the capacity for direct protection rather than pleading and influencing others 
to organise that protection. This capacity for direct protection can be summarised under the term 
of unarmed civilian peacekeeping, and the focus of this article will be to explore different aspects 
of this capacity in particular. The motivation here is not to belittle the importance of other roles, 
especially the role of advocacy in this field, but to put the spotlight on one approach to protection 
that has so far received very little attention. 
A More Encompassing Role of Civil Society under R2P
The four crimes that R2P deals with (genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and 
ethnic cleansing) are crimes that are closely linked to armed conflict in general. Cold-blooded 
genocide without the framework of a war is hard to envisage. Even the German Nazis only started 
to implement their plans of mass annihilation of Jews once World War II was well under way. The 
same is usually true for ethnic cleansing. War crimes in many cases are committed in the course of 
an armed conflict without having been planned or condoned from the outset. In some other cases, 
ethnic cleansing or genocide (or war crimes, e.g. rape) are part of a deliberate strategy chosen by 
an aggressor.9 That means that there is a strong overlap of, and connection between, seeking to 
prevent the crimes of R2P, and the prevention of armed conflict in general. All work on prevention 
of armed conflict could potentially be work on a R2P case, but it is often only in hindsight or once 
a conflict has escalated so much that there are concrete indicators warning of R2P crimes that the 
work is generally considered to be undertaken in the name of R2P. This problem contributes a great 
deal to the conceptual vagueness of R2P. In spite of the narrow definition of the four crimes as R2P 
cases, and in spite of the three phases (prevent, react, rebuild), R2P lacks focus until the moment 
concrete incidents of the four crimes are either threatened or actually happening.
Table 8) Conflict stages and R2P
Conflict phase Latent Escalating Open conflict with 
R2P situations
Ceasefire Return to 
normal
Responsibilities Prevent
(structural and 
systemic prevention)
Prevent
(operational 
prevention)
React Prevent and 
Rebuild
Rebuild
Pillars 1, (2) 1, 2 3, (1), 2 1, 2 1, (2)
Peace strategies (preventive strategies 
comparable to 
peacemaking and 
peacebuilding)
Peacemaking
peacekeeping
(peacebuilding)
Peacemaking
(peacekeeping, 
relief as almost 
only strategy of 
peacebuilding)
Peacekeeping
peacebuilding
(peacemaking, 
e.g. negotiating 
a peace treaty)
Peacebuilding, 
(and ongoing 
peacekeeping)
78 The four organisations are the International Crisis Group, Human Rights Watch, Institute International and Refugees 
International. It is housed at the The Graduate Center of  The City University of  New York, and financed by a number 
of  countries and foundations. See http://globalr2p.org/about.html [15.5.2009]
79 There is a danger of  war crimes in all armed conflicts- in fact it might be hard to find a single war where not one or 
the other side (usually both) became guilty of  committing war crimes. 
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In the following sections, this article will look at the role of civil society using the two parameters 
that have been developed for R2P: the three phases of responsibility (prevent, react, rebuild) and 
the three pillars. They stand in a rather complex relationship to each other and to the ideal-typical 
conflict curve:80
Civil Society in the Three Responsibilities
Responsibility to Prevent
What has been said above about the difficulty to differentiate between prevention and 
peacebuilding in general on the one hand, and in relation to R2P in particular, is most true for 
what has been called ‘deep’ (Lund 200) ‘structural’ (Carnegie Commission 199) or ‘structural’ 
and ‘systemic’ prevention (Rubin 2002). ‘Systemic’ prevention refers to the ‘promotion of policies 
that counteract ways that global institutions promote or facilitate violence’ (Rubin 2002:131), for 
example in the field of global economics, and is not country-specific. ‘Deep’ or ‘structural’ prevention 
deals with a situation in a specific country or region before the spiral of escalation is put in motion, 
and the danger develops of mass atrocities being committed. Structural prevention may mean to 
deal with economic injustices and to ensure human rights and political participation of all levels 
of society and all minorities. International wars, the number of which has been greatly reduced in 
the last decades, can be prevented by traditional mechanisms like power balances, conventions on 
disarmament and cooperation, democratisation of all countries in question, or joint membership 
in international organisations. 
If a conflict has clearly begun to escalate, then what is needed is what the Carnegie Foundation 
and Rubin call ‘operational’ prevention – specific actions taken to confront an imminent crisis. 
Here there needs to be no doubt that a certain situation may be of relevance for R2P, because there 
is usually clear evidence that indicates the potential for such crimes.81 Instruments applicable by civil 
society actors in such contexts include second-track mediation, dialogue support, and advocacy for 
decisive action by the country in question and/or by the international community. 
In addition to such instruments, all of which would fall under peacemaking and peacebuilding, 
there is also a role for preventive peacekeeping. Its basic idea is to deter and prevent violence by 
the means of the presence of a peacekeeping force. As to military peacekeeping, the first preventive 
mission was UNPROFOR (later UNPREDEP) in Macedonia in 1992-1999. Its work, based on the 
classical ‘blue helmet’ mandate without enforcement power or heavy armament, has been generally 
evaluated as an important contribution to maintaining peace in that country.82 
The idea of preventive peacekeeping has so far rarely been practiced, but few would not agree 
that in many circumstances it may be a good instrument to use. The question that needs to be asked 
is: Does it have to be the military? A few points to consider:
Even if wishing for peace, many countries have serious concerns about allowing international 
military forces onto their territory—even if under UN auspices. 
There is the danger of militarising a situation further by pulling more military into it. 
80 What is not meant when speaking of  a more encompassing role of  civil society are the forms of  integration of  
military and civilian personnel and action as in the different CIMIC-concepts, the US Human Terrain Teams or 
the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan. The question to be pursued here are rather options for an 
autochthonous, independent civilian role that has the potential to be an alternative to military options.
81 See the indicators for developments in racial discrimination that may lead to violent conflict and genocide formulated 
by the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of  Racial Discrimination 2005.
82 See Lund 2000.
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If one or the other of the conflict parties does not accept the presence of such peacekeepers, 
they may become the first targets, and thereby contribute to the escalation of the conflict 
instead of the contrary.
For these reasons, unarmed civilian peacekeeping conducted either by state missions or civil 
society actors would be an option avoiding these risks at least to a certain degree:
It is often easier to find acceptance for an international civilian mission (see the examples 
below for post-conflict peacekeeping missions in Kosovo-Serbia 1998, Bougainville 199, 
Georgia 2008).83 
On the cultural and symbolic level, civilians express civilian values by their very presence. In 
addition, the fact of being unarmed may send to the parties in conflict a message of trust that 
they themselves are interested in peace.
At a superficial level, the danger of peacekeepers becoming targets is the same whether they 
are armed or unarmed. But while armed peacekeepers, especially those with heavy weaponry, 
are often sent under a Chapter VII mandate and rely on potential armed force for their 
own protection, the mere fact that unarmed peacekeepers need to activate other sources of 
protection, including acceptance and protection by local communities, may increase their 
protection from being targeted. 
Responsibility to React
During the ‘hot’ phases of a conflict, civil society is not by any means excluded from work 
for peace, though its possibilities are more limited. A recent comparative study conducted by the 
Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding (CCDP) in Geneva entitled ‘Civil Society 
and Peacebuilding’ found that ‘during phases of war, the space for civil society to act is reduced 
drastically. The main goal during this phase is to lessen violence. Civil society can monitor human 
rights violations, advocate and facilitate a dialogue for the protection of civilians, and ultimately 
protect people from suffering due to the war. As such, the functions of protection, monitoring, 
advocacy and facilitation are of particular relevance within this phase.’ (Paffenholz 2009a:8)8
What exactly can be done during an armed conflict depends entirely on the context. Where 
there is high-level intense and widespread violent conflict, protecting civilians by helping them to 
get to safe places, ensuring that victims receive adequate humanitarian aid, and using all possible 
channels for bringing the parties back to the negotiating table may be all that can be done. As was 
evident in the final months of the conflict in Sri Lanka, even that often proves difficult enough. 
Where violence is more sporadic or geographically limited, unarmed civilian peacekeeping may 
be an option as well. The presence of peacekeepers, for example, could help communities that 
do seek to avoid being drawn into the troubles of war to be respected as peace zones from all 
sides. Peacekeepers can help to bring displaced people to safe places or can through protective 
accompaniment lessen one of the side effects of war—namely the rising lawlessness and attacks on 
human rights activists, journalists and other parts of civil society. These activities can help to prevent 
war crimes or ethnic cleansing to a certain point. Examples include the international presence of 
protective accompaniers in peace communities in Colombia or the combined efforts of local and 
international peace monitors today in Mindanao, Philippines.8
83 See Schweitzer et al 2001, Mahony 2006.
84 Other important roles for civil society are service delivery (humanitarian aid) and, if  there is a window of  opportunity 
for peace negotiations, to facilitate the onset of  such negotiations or to influence their contents. 
85 See Bantay Ceasefire 2003, Schirch 2006.
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Responsibility to Rebuild
After a violent conflict is ended, whether by ceasefire or military victory, the tasks of 
peacebuilding remain (see above footnote 13) and ensuring that there is a secure environment in 
which peacebuilding can take place. The same level of generality mentioned in respect of prevention 
can be observed for rebuilding. Whether or not R2P crimes happened during a conflict has no 
bearing on the tasks of post-war rebuilding. To perpetrators these tasks may appear particularly 
threatening; and transitional justice and dealing with trauma may be of prime importance. But as 
far as we can see, there is nothing sui generis in rebuilding for R2P.
The ‘traditional’ division of labor here has international military forces taking care of security 
while civilians from both governmental and nongovernmental institutions and agencies take care of 
the peacebuilding.86 But there have been cases in which unarmed peacekeeping was chosen in place 
of military peacekeeping in this phase of conflict. Such civilian missions are often deployed in cases 
where the target countries would not accept foreign military on their territory and the international 
community was not willing or able to enforce such a mission. UN Monitoring Missions, many 
missions by the OSCE (including the Kosovo Verification Mission of 1998-99), by the EU (the 
EU Monitoring Missions in the former Yugoslavia and since 2008 in Georgia), and the Truce/Peace 
Monitoring Mission set up in Bougainville after 199 belong in this category.8 
Beside these governmental unarmed peacekeeping missions, there has been and still is comparable 
work by civil society actors. One example is the Philippines: For over 30 years, more than 120,000 
lives have been lost in the struggle for independence waged by Muslim groups against the Christian 
majority in Mindanao, the second largest island in the Philippines. The main guerrilla group, the 
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), signed a peace treaty with the Philippine government 
in 1996. MNLF leaders joined the government structures in Mindanao, mainly in what was then 
the newly-created Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). But another group calling 
itself the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) split from MNLF and continued the fight. It 
took many years and several ceasefire agreements before fighting more or less stopped, and violent 
incidents still occur in central Mindanao. Negotiations for a comprehensive peace agreement have 
been undertaken (though at this writing, in early 2009, the talks are stalled).
The ceasefire was being monitored through an official mechanism, including both the 
government and the MILF, with four elements: The Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of 
Hostilities (CCCH), Local Monitoring Teams comprised of civil society actors, an International 
Monitoring Team staffed mostly by Malaysia, and an Ad-hoc Joint Action Group. The CCCH set 
up monitoring posts in the conflict areas that were staffed by government and MILF soldiers as well 
as with representatives of local civil society initiatives. The extraordinary feature of this set-up is the 
close involvement of several hundred local civil society peacekeepers mostly working in a voluntary 
capacity. These local peace groups invited the international NGO Nonviolent Peaceforce (NP) to 
send an international team to provide support and protective presence to local groups working 
to enhance civil society initiatives and prevent violence. NP started to work in Mindanao in May 
200.
86 This traditional jobshare has become more diffuse in the recent years by the military forces (e.g. Afghanistan) 
assuming more and more civilian reconstruction task. See Burghardt & Pietz 2006, Brzoska & Ehrhart 2008.
87 See Böge 1999, Ramsbotham & Woodhouse 1999, and the report of  a seminar ‚Monitoring Peace in Bougainville‘ 
that was hold at the Australian National University on the 8th of  September 1999. The talks of  different participants 
of  the monitoring mission can be found in the report that is available on Internet (http://rspas.anu.edu.au/melanesia, 
[25.4.2001]).
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Together with local groups, its quick responses to several smaller and larger incidents in Central 
Mindanao, as well as the Sulu Archipelago including Basilan, have helped to prevent incidents 
leading to a full-scale military confrontation.88 
So far, there are few other examples for civil peacekeeping that go beyond the protection of 
individual activists through protective accompaniment as Peace Brigades International and others 
offer.89 The reason is not that such peacekeeping is conceptually impossible, but rather that so far 
nongovernmental actors have for the most part lacked the resources to engage in this personnel-
intensive (and therefore, compared to other peacebuilding work, expensive) endeavour. This type 
of work is financed primarily through budget lines of international agencies, ministries or the EU 
that are not intended for peacekeeping but for development cooperation. In recent years, many 
of these funders have developed an understanding of and support for projects of unarmed civilian 
protection, but the very outline of their budgets are often critical about the funding of a larger 
number of international staff. This maxim is well-justified in development cooperation, but it 
violates the very purpose of civilian peacekeeping initiatives for which staff (rather then material 
aid or projects carried out with local partners) is the very centre of its work.
Civil Society in the Three Pillars
Pillar 1: The Role of Local Civil Society in Protection
Pillar 1 describes the responsibilities of each State to protect its population from the R2P crimes 
and their incitement. When asking about the role of civil society, we need to look at local peace-
builders, human rights defenders, peace advocates, citizens’ groups generally working for democracy 
and political and civil rights and freedom, and of course humanitarian groups contributing to 
peaceful developments by trying to alleviate poverty and suffering. 
As quoted above from the Geneva study (Paffenholz 2009a), the roles of monitoring, advocacy 
and dialogue facilitation can be assumed by civil society actors not only before and after but also 
during armed conflict. A famous example is the women of Wajir. The Wajir-District is located 
in the arid areas of Northeastern Kenya. At the end of the 19th century, the district was absorbed 
into the British colony of East Africa, despite the fact that its inhabitants were almost exclusively 
Somalis. After Kenya’s independence in 1963, there were two armed conflicts in the area. First Kenya 
and Somalia fought over control of Wajir, then there was an unsuccessful uprising of the Wajiris 
against Nairobi to achieve secession from Kenya. After that war, Wajir was governed between 196 
and 1992 by emergency rule and the region was further impoverished, leading to violent resource 
conflict among the three leading family clans of the area. These clans also recruited mercenaries 
from Somalia and Ethiopia. In 1992, after a prolonged period of drought, open war erupted among 
the three clans. International NGOs left the region in 1993 after the death of a UN worker. In 
this situation and in absence of any state authority that could have dealt with the conflict, a group 
of Somali women founded the Wajir Women for Peace (later called the Wajir Peace Group). The 
women joining had to pledge to work for peace under all circumstances, even if their clans attacked 
each other. 
88 See the website of  Nonviolent Peaceforce: http://www.nonviolentpeaceforce.org 
89 Other examples are the election monitoring during the first elections in South Africa 1994, the accompaniment 
of  refugees and displaced in some Latin American countries (e.g. Guatemala), the shorter-term monitoring in Haiti 
through the Cry Justice coalition of  civil society groups and the work of  different solidarity and observation groups 
in Palestine. For more examples and assessments of  the mentioned work, see Moser-Puangsuwan & Weber 2000, 
Schweitzer et al 2001 and Schirch 2006.
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Their first activities were meetings with the elders of a clan. The women particularly sought to 
involve the elders from small clans that were able to play a mediating role. After intensive work and 
overcoming many obstacles, the women managed to convince the elders to found a joint committee 
to discuss the problems. After some meetings, there was a larger peace conference in September 
1993 in which both a ceasefire and the end of the widely-practiced theft of animals were agreed 
upon, as well as a Code of Conduct. The results of the conference were the key factor in bringing the 
situation to a positive end, and the Wajir Peace Group became the most important actor for peace 
in the region. In the following years, they have undertaken a large number of activities involving 
the Kenyan government, clans, parliamentarians, civil servants, religious leaders, and others. One of 
the founders of the group, Dekha Ibrahim Abdi, received the 200 Right Livelihood Award, often 
referred to as the Alternative Nobel Prize for Peace.90 
While this example would fall under the category of peacemaking, there are also numerous 
activities of unarmed civilian peacekeeping by local actors. What has not been recognized in 
documents on R2P so far is that local civil society has already been playing a direct role in preventing 
large-scale violence. Examples include monitoring of ceasefire agreements (e.g. Bantay Ceasefire 
and the Society of Bangsamoro Civil Society in Mindanao, Philippines), elections (e.g. the Sri 
Lankan organisation PAFFREL and its partners in other countries in the region), or by protecting 
vulnerable groups like internally displaced persons and refugees by maintaining a presence at refugee 
camps and houses (e.g. the work of a number of German grassroots groups in the 1990s when 
fascist groups attacked the homes of refugees). 
Perhaps the best-known examples of local civil society organisations involved in direct protection 
work are the Pakistani and Indian ‘peace armies’ developed by Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Mohandas 
Gandhi. The peace armies, or ‘shanti sena,’ were units formed by citizens of local communities who 
committed to service for their community and protection against violence. The members of shanti 
sena primarily worked where they lived, becoming so-called peace soldiers only when there was an 
emergency. They worked to de-escalate communal riots, helped to re-integrate members of criminal 
gangs into society, and did humanitarian work during refugee crises (like the 191 Bangladesh 
war) or natural disasters. Their effectiveness is mainly derived from their membership in the local 
communities. They seek to change the minds of those ready to apply violence, and to strengthen 
the communities to resist that violence, using methods of dialogue, counteracting rumours, and 
physical interpositioning as needed.91 
Pillar 2: The Role of International Civil Society in Protection 
Under Pillar 2, we are looking at international civil society – the quickly growing network 
of transnationally active NGOs working in these same fields as listed above under Pillar 1. In 
the process of the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) the range 
and depths of this work has been analysed and presented in a large conference in 200 to the 
United Nations.92 Once more it needs to be stressed that most of the instruments used here are 
not particular to R2P situations – prevention, peacebuilding, peacekeeping and peacemaking are 
general strategies of a much wider range than only dealing with the extreme cases of R2P – in a 
certain sense these four R2P crimes are the tip of the iceberg of the wider issues of violent conflict. 
The particular work of unarmed civilian peacekeeping has been described in the sections above 
under the three different responsibilities.
90 See Mathews 2001, USAID in http://eastafrica.usaid.gov/en/Article.1117.aspx [20.11.2008]).
91 See Abdul Ghaffar Khan 1995, Weber 1996, Schweitzer et al 2001, and the references given there.
92 See http://www.gppac.net.
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Pillar 3: A Role for Civil Society if Earlier Prevention has Failed?
If all that which was described above under Pillar 1 and 2 fails, including ‚peacekeeping by 
consent,‘ (national and/or international civilian peacekeepers working on invitation, or at least 
tolerance, of the government and other armed actors), are there also options that local and/or 
international civil society has when there is an acute R2P case, but the State in question is not able 
and willing to handle it? 
Civil society does lack direct enforcement capacity. It cannot just send an army that through 
superior fire power can efficiently pacify violent perpetrators.93 The status of internationals is 
different. If a government decides that it doesn’t want the internationals on its soil, internationals 
have little choice but to leave, as was recently demonstrated in Darfur. The number of instruments 
of local civil society under such circumstances is very limited, though as has been found in the 
Geneva study quoted above, even in cases of open war and conflict there is still a protection role to 
play for local civil society. 
My intention is not to speculate about possible ways that internationals may enter a country 
against the will of the powerholders. There may be, in exceptional circumstances, such possibilities.9 
But these are not R2P situations, and it could be argued that the more violence escalates, the less 
likely it becomes that such entry has a chance of success.
The question for civil society under the third pillar is another one, and is salient for civil society 
as for the international community in general: If the State in question is not able or willing to 
prevent a R2P situation, how can the State be convinced to allow others to come in and take 
over the function that the State itself has proven unable to play? The mentioned advocacy role of 
international civil society comes into play here, and the option of unarmed civilian peacekeeping 
may, as has been argued above, be more palatable to such a State then the deployment of a military 
force.
Having addressed the limitations of international civil society under Pillar 3, there is one additional 
consideration: International civil society may play a role in protection between Pillar 2 and Pillar 3, 
a role that goes further than that of governmental (civilian or military) missions, because it is not 
dependent on a formal international agreement that sometimes is difficult to achieve. Civil society 
actors do have a different legal basis. For them to work in a country, it is enough to be tolerated 
by the government of the State in question. While unarmed peacekeepers will usually seek formal 
permission or even invitation to work in a country, in numerous cases they had to satisfy themselves 
with the grudging permission of being allowed into the country legally. This means that they may 
still be able to work in a country in a situation where governmental missions would not be invited 
or their invitation revoked. This is an advantage that the international community concerned with 
preventing mass atrocities could make use of by consciously supporting the unarmed peacekeeping 
work of INGOs in countries where official outside missions themselves are not allowed to go.
There are also some secondary advantages NGOs may have over state-run missions. When 
they have been in an area for a longer period, they often have better-founded relationships and 
knowledge of the situation on the ground. While staff in international (governmental) missions is 
often rotated every six months, the average stay of civilian workers is two years or even longer. This 
93 I leave aside here the question if  that kind of  military intervention is not more a chimera than a real option. In the 
discussion on such kind of  enforcement missions, it is more often argued with examples of  those cases where such 
enforcement did NOT happen (like in Rwanda) like in cases where it was tried (Cambodia, Kosovo). The reason may 
be that these real-life examples leave many questions open, both in regard to their legitimacy as to their outcomes. 
94 For example there is the work of  the different solidarity groups working in Palestine which enter Palestine with bare 
tolerance by the Israeli government and who to a certain though limited extent is successful in providing protection to 
civilians, e.g. accompanying school children threatened by extremist settlers. See Schirch 2006.
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allows them to build much better relations at the grassroots level—the very level at which violence 
often originates.
Conclusions
1. In his implementation report on R2P, the UN Secretary-General has once more raised the call 
to create a standing or standby force ready to intervene in conflicts. Possible suggestions:
that in the draft mandate of such a standby force, the functions of unarmed peacekeeping 
are included;
that civilians sent to monitoring missions by the United Nations, one of its regional 
organisations, or other international organisations like the European Union are trained in 
methods of unarmed peacekeeping in addition to the other tasks they are meant to perform;
that unarmed civilian peacekeeping is included in the checklists and budget lines of such 
agencies as DPKO and OCHA.
2. Investment in institutional capacities for conflict prevention is essential. This is a demand raised 
in many places nowadays.95 For every dollar spent on peacebuilding around the world, nearly 
two thousand dollars are spent on defence and the military.96 ‘...[D]espite increasing rhetorical 
enthusiasm, the international community has repeatedly failed to invest in early action. As a 
result, peaceful measures, such as preventive diplomacy, have been under-used by the Security 
Council, leaving situations that could have been de-escalated to fester until the only option is 
to impose coercive measures under Chapter VII of  the Charter’ (International Peace Institute 
2009:7). In order to be able to implement measures of  operational prevention, there is a need 
for the establishment of  an early warning capability on national, regional and international 
bases, e.g. at the European Union and at the United Nations.
3. One particular instrument of  prevention of  armed violence is unarmed civilian peacekeeping. 
It is an instrument to which much less attention has been paid so far than to other instruments 
of  conflict prevention. It is suggested here that the European Union, the UN and the other 
international organisations consider making use of  the offer of  NGOs to perform protection 
tasks in countries and contexts where for whatever reason international governmental 
peacekeeping missions cannot be sent. This could happen designating them as official 
‘implementing partners’ or by simply funding through extra budgets devoted to R2P (including 
a new trustfund at the disposal of  the UN S-G), thereby stopping the current problem of  
unarmed peacekeeping competing for funding with humanitarian and development cooperation 
projects.
4. The European Union, the United Nations and regional organisations should find a place in 
their structure that focuses on unarmed civilian peacekeeping as an instrument of  its own. 
This could be an office, an expert panel, or a subcommission to investigate the reasons for the 
curious underemployment of  unarmed global peacekeepers—professionals who, by their very 
presence, will deter abuses and protect threatened local populations, including peaceworkers 
and humanitarian and human rights workers. The principal role of  the body would be to begin 
to capture the world’s imagination about the significant contribution the use of  such peace 
forces could make. The initial emphasis would be on advocacy, training and communication 
to do the much-needed consciousness-raising among several priority audiences and, ultimately, 
95 See GPPAC 2009, International Peace Institute 2009.
96 Figures from the OECD, taken from Smart Power - Saving Money, Saving Lives: Why Conflict Prevention Policy 
Needs to be Joined Up. Forthcoming Publication of  the International Task Force on Preventive Diplomacy, quoted 
from GPPAC 2009
•
•
•
63
Christine Schweitzer -  Civilian Peacekeeping
the general population.  
5. The question could and should be asked whether the legitimisation of  NGOs, especially of  those 
involved in protection work, could be strengthened by recognition through the United Nations. 
Of  course we are not necessarily suggesting here that the UN Security Council should in the 
next years mandate NGOs to intervene the same way it currently mandates a UN peacekeeping 
mission, or sanctions other international organisations or ‘coalitions of  the willing’ to ‘use 
all means necessary’ to alleviate a presumed R2P situation. The mere fact that there are ten 
thousands if  not more NGOs worldwide alone probably forbids such an act of  mandating 
civil society the same way as States or other international organisations (NATO) are mandated 
today. But there is nothing that would forbid or preclude the Security Council referring to the 
work of  unarmed peacekeeping by NGOs in its decisions on a particular crisis, the same way 
is it sometimes refers to humanitarian aid being allowed or continued, thereby strengthening 
the legitimization of  these NGOs (see criterion # 10 of  Lewer and Ramsbotham). And of  
course nothing excludes UN organisations choosing NGOs (local or international) as their 
implementing partners.
6. A capacity for unarmed civilian peacekeeping at large scale must be created. Measures needed 
for that include: 
Training of a large number of people with the skills to be deployed when needed;
Maintaining up-to-date rosters of such individuals with their special assets; 
Training in civilian unarmed peacekeeping for civil servants and soldiers who are deployed in 
governmental unarmed missions;
A global initiative convincing UN Member States to create labour laws that free people to 
leave their civilian jobs for such deployments the same way as in most countries military 
reservists can be called in for service without losing their jobs; 
Financial resources for such missions set aside and quickly accessible (without long application 
deadlines). This could be prepared by a pre-screening of civil society organisations that then 
are considered trustworthy of deployment and funding of additional programmes.
We do not know how many Rwandas have already been prevented. The number of violent 
conflicts clearly declined in recent years, a fact attributed to international efforts.9 Successful 
conflict transformation in early stages can be easily demonstrated, but it is always helpful to 
speculate on the possibility of mass atrocities having thus been prevented. One thing is sure: 
National and international civil society has always been a crucial factor where there was true conflict 
transformation. And protection work is one important area to which civil society has already made 
contributions extending far beyond advocacy to urge States to meet their responsibility to protect. 
Civil society does have its own responsibility to protect, and it is ready to assume much greater 
responsibility.
Unarmed civilian peacekeeping need not be the second choice, considered only in light of 
failures of political will and funding to send military peacekeepers. I have attempted in this paper to 
make clear that in many situations, especially in the context of prevention and after wars, unarmed 
civilian peacekeeping can be the first option precisely because it IS less threatening to those in 
power, and therefore has a chance to be accepted when the only choice would otherwise be to call 
upon the Security Council to send a mission under Chapter VII. 
97 See Human Security Centre 2005 and 2006.
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Zusammenfassung
Das Arbeitspapier, das das IFGK zusammen mit Nonviolent Peaceforce herausgibt, enthält fünf 
Beiträge zum Thema „Ziviles Peacekeeping“. Ziviles Peacekeeping (deutsch: “Friedenssicherung“) 
hat bislang in der Friedensforschung eine vergleichsweise geringe Rolle gespielt. Aus diesem Grund 
hat das IFGK bislang unveröffentlichte oder nur auf Internetseiten  zu findende Artikel zu dieser 
Publikation zusammengestellt.
Die Beiträge wurden – mit Ausnahme der Einleitung – unabhängig voneinander und für 
verschiedene Zielgruppen  geschrieben. Zumeist wandten sie sich an Politik und Wissenschaft, 
erst in zweiter Linie an Menschen in den Friedensbewegungen. Trotz gewisser Unterschiede in 
den inhaltlichen Gewichtungen plädieren alle AutorInnen für einen weltweiten Ausbau des zivilen 
Peacekeepings und seine Förderung durch die Vereinten Nationen sowie die Staatenwelt im 
allgemeinen. Alle AutorInnen sind mit Nonviolent Peaceforce (NP) zeitweilig verbunden gewesen 
oder sind es noch, so erklärt sich, dass NP bei den gewählten Beispielen eine große Rolle spielt.
In der Einleitung definiert Christine Schweitzer Ziviles Peacekeeping als die Verhinderung 
direkter Gewalt durch Beeinflussung oder Kontrolle des Verhaltens potentieller Gewaltausübender 
durch unbewaffnete ZivilistInnen, die vor Ort eine Präsenz aufgebaut haben. Die Autorin sieht 
sie als Menschheitsaufgabe zur Überwindung von Krieg. Vier historische Quellen haben die 
Entwicklung des Peacekeepings gespeist: die  Idee von Gandhi zu einer Friedensarmee (Shanti 
Sena), europäische und nordamerikanische Versuchen, Kriege gewaltfrei zu stoppen, indem sich 
internationale AktivistInnen zwischen die Fronten stellten, verschiedene vor allem an die Vereinten 
Nationen gerichtete Vorschläge zum Aufbau von Einheiten zur unbewaffneten Friedenssicherung 
und das Vorbild des militärischen Peacekeepings. Vier Hauptformen zivilen Peacekeepings können 
unterschieden werden:
1. Friedensteams in verschiedenen, Graden an Unparteilichkeit und Aufgabenstellungen;
2. Zivile staatliche Missionen wie z. B. die EU Beobachtungsmissionen im ehemaligen Jugoslawien 
oder seit 2008 in Georgien;
3. Schutz als eine Aufgabe, die von humanitären, Entwicklungs- und Menschenrechtsorganisationen 
als Teil ihrer Arbeit wahrgenommen wird;
4. Noch zu leisten ist: Der Ausbau von zivilem Peacekeeping durch NROs in einem Ausmaß, das 
ihre Arbeit mit der Reichweite staatlicher Missionen vergleichbar macht.
Rolf Carrières Beitrag „Die Welt braucht ein anderes Peacekeeping“ beginnt mit einer 
Beschreibung des globalen Kontextes, in dem die Ideen der drei Friedensstrategien Peacemaking, 
Peacekeeping und Peacebuilding entstanden. Nach einer Auflistung einiger Begrenzungen 
militärischer Friedenssicherung beschreibt er die Funktionsweise des unbewaffneten zivilen 
Peacekeepings und die Gründe für ihre Wirksamkeit. Danach bezieht er sich auf einige jüngere 
Schriften zur Ökonomie des Krieges und beschreibt die immensen Vorteile, die ein Ende des 
Krieges und die Herstellung von Frieden mit sich bringen.
Tim Wallis stellte seinen Aufsatz „Best Practices des unbewaffneten zivilen Peacekeeping“ wie 
auch Rolf Carriere im Sommer 2009 bei einer Konferenz auf den Philippinen vor. Er unterscheidet 
fünf Typen zivilerAkteure der Friedenssicherung: unbewaffnetes Militär, internationale Polizei, 
unbewaffnete ZivilistInnen mit einem offiziellen Mandat (z.B. UN BeobachterInnen), unbewaffnete 
ZivilistInnen aus der Zivilgesellschaft (z.B. von humanitären NROs) und unbewaffnete ZivilistInnen 
mit speziellen Fähigkeiten und einem speziellen Mandat für Peacekeeping. Er illustriert anhand 
einiger Beispiele, was zivile Peacekeeper für die Verhinderung von Gewalt leisten können. Im letzten 
Abschnitt seines Beitrags diskutiert er Grundprinzipien, die für die Erfolgswahrscheinlichkeit 
zivilen Peacekeepings bestimmend sind: 1. Unparteilichkeit, Unabhängigkeit und internationaler 
Charakter, 2. Gewaltfreiheit und 3. Sichtbarkeit, Transparenz, stille Diplomatie und kulturelle 
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Sensibilität. . Er endet damit, dass Präsenz alleine nicht genug sei, um von Gewalt-Handlungen 
abzuschrecken,  und dass auch Regierungsmissionen allein in manchen Fällen nicht ausreichten, 
weshalb ausgebildete und mandatierte zivile Peacekeeper, die von NROs entsendet werden, eine 
wichtige Funktion haben können.
Rachel Julians Beitrag „Peacekeeping mit Gewaltfreiheit: Strategien des Schutzes für nachhaltigen 
Frieden“ beginnt wie der von Carrière mit der Einordnung von unbewaffnetem Peacekeeping in 
die Triade der drei Friedensstrategien. Unter Bezugnahme auf Schirch (2006) und Eguren (2009) 
beschreibt Julian anschließend verschiedene Ansätze und Methoden zivilen Peacekeepings. 
Der erste Aufsatz von Christine Schweitzer befasst sich mit der Frage: „Humanitärer Schutz als 
eine zusätzliche Funktion von humanitären, Entwicklungs- und Friedensprojekten – oder eher eine 
Aufgabe, die Experten fordert?“ Auf der Basis von zwei Fallstudien (dem ehemaligen Jugoslawien 
in den 90er Jahren und der Arbeit von NP in den Philippinen seit 200 erfolgt ein Vergleich über 
die Vorteile und Schwächen beider Optionen. Die Autorin endet mit dem Fazit, dass es Situationen 
gibt, in denen die Präsenz spezialisierter Peacekeeper von Vorteil sein kann.
Christine Schweitzers zweites Papier, „Die Schutzverantwortung: Auf dem Weg zu einer 
erweiterten Rolle für die globale Zivilgesellschaft“ beschäftigt sich mit der Doktrin der „Responsibility 
to Protect“ (R2P). Der Artikel zeigt auf, dass einheimische und internationale Zivilgesellschaften 
eine viel größere Rolle in den verschiedenen Phasen (Verhinderung, Reaktion und Wiederaufbau) 
und den drei Säulen von R2P (Verantwortung des betroffenen Staates, internationale Hilfe und 
Intervention) spielen können, als bislang anerkannt wird. Die Autorin stimmt denjenigen zu, die 
argumentieren, dass R2P mehr ist als ein Vorwand zur Legitimation sogenannter „humanitärer“ 
militärischer Interventionen. Die Zivilgesellschaft trage insbesondere dazu bei, zu verhindern, dass 
eine „R2P-Situation“ (Säule 3) überhaupt entsteht.
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